


STRATEGIC ROLE OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL DIASPORA IN PROMOTING  
SEPARATISM IN SRI LANKA



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2014-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE   |                                   |  |   | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 0704-0188   |  |
|---|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| <p>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</p>   |                                   |  |   |  |  |
| 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)<br>13-06-2014   | 2. REPORT TYPE<br>Master's Thesis |  | 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)<br>AUG 2013 – JUN 2014                           |  |  |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><br>STRATEGIC ROLE OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL DIASPORA IN PROMOTING SEPARATISM IN SRI LANKA   |                                   |  | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER<br><br>5b. GRANT NUMBER<br><br>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER |  |  |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><br>Maddumage Kelum S, Major, Sri Lanka Army  |                                   |  | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER<br><br>5e. TASK NUMBER<br><br>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER         |  |  |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College<br>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, KS 66027   |                                   |  | 8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER   |  |  |
| 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)   |                                   |  | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)  |  |  |
|   |                                   |  | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)  |  |  |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited   |                                   |  |   |  |  |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES   |                                   |  |   |  |  |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br>The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) fought a three-decade counter-insurgency war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization that adopted a separatist ideology to create a "State of Eelam" for the Tamil minority in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora played a strategic role in the conflict as an external actor providing large sums of funds, procuring military material, running its shipping companies, providing moral support, and most significantly enhancing the international attitude towards the LTTE. It is not yet certain whether the GoSL achieved the defeat of the insurgency with the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, as the Tamil diaspora still continues to promote the separatist cause through political, diplomatic, and informational approaches. In 2010, the Tamil diaspora established a Government in Exile, the "Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam" (TGTE), as a step towards the actualization of its cause. The Tamil diaspora's shift of focus to a "non-violent" and "political-diplomatic" approach has gained it some acceptance and support internationally. This research investigates how a separatist movement could regain its momentum through an external actor such as a diaspora by analyzing the case of the current strategic role of the Tamil diaspora in promoting separatism in Sri Lanka. |                                   |  |   |  |  |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS<br>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil diaspora, Separate state, Homeland, Selfdetermination, Eelam, Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), Sri Lanka, Insurgency, Separatism, Hybrid Threats   |                                   |  |   |  |  |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:<br><br>a. REPORT<br>(U)   |                                   | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT<br><br>b. ABSTRACT<br>(U) | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES<br><br>c. THIS PAGE<br>(U)                                | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON<br><br>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) |  |
| 126   |                                   |  |   |  |  |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Kelum S. Maddumage

Thesis Title: Strategic Role of Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Promoting Separatism  
in Sri Lanka

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
Stuart D. Lyon, MPA

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
MAJ Angela L. Scott, MSEM

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
William Kautt, Ph.D., FRHist.S.

Accepted this 13th day of June 2014 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency (references to this study should include the foregoing statement).

## ABSTRACT

### STRATEGIC ROLE OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL DIASPORA IN PROMOTING SEPARATISM IN SRI LANKA, by Major Kelum S. Maddumage, 126 pages.

The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) fought a three-decade counter-insurgency war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization that adopted a separatist ideology to create a “State of Eelam” for the Tamil minority in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora played a strategic role in the conflict as an external actor providing large sums of funds, procuring military material, running its shipping companies, providing moral support, and most significantly enhancing the international attitude towards the LTTE. It is not yet certain whether the GoSL achieved the defeat of the insurgency with the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009, as the Tamil diaspora still continues to promote the separatist cause through political, diplomatic, and informational approaches. In 2010, the Tamil diaspora established a Government in Exile, the “Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam” (TGTE), as a step towards the actualization of its cause. The Tamil diaspora’s shift of focus to a “non-violent” and “political-diplomatic” approach has gained it some acceptance and support internationally. This research investigates how a separatist movement could regain its momentum through an external actor such as a diaspora by analyzing the case of the current strategic role of the Tamil diaspora in promoting separatism in Sri Lanka.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I acknowledge with a great sense of gratitude the academic guidance, instructions, and editorial assistance by Mr. Stuart D. Lyon, the Thesis Committee Chair. His encouragement, motivation, and steering helped me continuously focus on the required standard for this thesis. I would like to place on record my humble thanks to MAJ Angela L. Scott, for her continuous efforts to guide me during the process and the long hours she spent on editing this paper. I acknowledge Dr. William Kautt, with much appreciation for his academic inputs and editorial assistance. I would also like to place on record my appreciation to CH (MAJ) Sean Wead; Seminar Group Leader, who provided additional guidance on writing this paper.

I also wish to thank Mr. Ranjit J. Perera for his editorial assistance despite his busy schedule. I wish to extend my sincere thanks to LTC Stephen W. Smith, Staff Group Advisor of 8A, who supported me in many ways during the year.

I acknowledge with great regard the valuable inputs given by members of my seminar group. I thank the staff at Combined Arms Research Library for providing me the required materials to write the thesis. I thank the staff at International Military Students Division, Graduate Studies Division with special mention of Ms. Venita A. Krueger, and also the staff at the Command and General Staff College for the numerous occasions they extended support to me during this journey.

Last but not the least, I must thank to my loving wife Chamari for giving me moral courage, strength, and support to complete this work. I thank my loving daughter Gayathmie for her patience and acceptance of my frequent absence due to my commitment into this endeavor.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....     | iii  |
| ABSTRACT.....   | iv   |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....   | v    |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....  | vi   |
| ACRONYMS.....   | ix   |
| ILLUSTRATIONS .....   | xi   |
| TABLES .....  | xii  |
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....                                      | 1    |
| Historical Background .....                                       | 2    |
| Period from Independence to the Defeat of the LTTE .....          | 5    |
| Importance of the Study.....                                      | 9    |
| Research Question .....   | 11   |
| Scope.....  | 12   |
| Limitations .....   | 12   |
| CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....                                 | 14   |
| Concepts of State, Statehood, Sovereignty and Homeland .....      | 14   |
| Concepts of Insurgency and Separatism.....                        | 17   |
| Lifecycle of an Insurgent Movement.....                           | 20   |
| Concept adopted by the LTTE .....                                 | 23   |
| Political Representations of the LTTE Ideology .....              | 25   |
| Diaspora .....  | 26   |
| Concept of Ethnie .....   | 27   |
| Diaspora's Contribution in a Conflict.....                        | 29   |
| The LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora .....                  | 30   |
| The Tamil Diaspora as an Actor in the Sri Lankan Conflict .....   | 32   |
| The Tamil Diaspora after the Defeat of the LTTE .....             | 37   |
| The Present Tamil Diaspora International Structure .....          | 38   |
| The LTTE's nexus with Tamil Diaspora Groups .....                 | 42   |
| Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK, Canada, and the U.S.A. ..... | 43   |
| Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK .....                         | 43   |
| Political Significance .....                                      | 44   |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Diplomatic Reach.....  | 46  |
| Tamil Diaspora Activities in Canada.....                                     | 48  |
| Political Significance .....   | 49  |
| Diplomatic Reach.....  | 50  |
| Tamil Diaspora Activities in the U.S.A.....                                  | 53  |
| Political Significance .....   | 54  |
| Diplomatic Reach.....  | 56  |
| Tamil Diaspora Propaganda Networks .....                                     | 57  |
| Case Studies of East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan Separatism .....         | 61  |
| East Timor.....  | 61  |
| Kosovo .....   | 63  |
| South Sudan .....  | 64  |
| CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....   | 66  |
| CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .....   | 71  |
| Analysis of ideological alignment of the LTTE and the Tamil Diaspora.....    | 71  |
| Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora contribution during the LTTE’s Lifecycle..... | 72  |
| Pre-insurgency stage .....   | 73  |
| Incipient conflict stage .....   | 73  |
| Open insurgency stage .....  | 75  |
| Political contribution.....  | 75  |
| Military contribution .....  | 76  |
| External assistance .....  | 76  |
| Resolution stage .....   | 77  |
| Analysis of Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK, Canada, and the U.S.A. .... | 78  |
| Analysis of activities in the UK .....                                       | 78  |
| Analysis of activities in Canada.....  | 79  |
| Analysis of activities in the U.S.A.....                                     | 80  |
| Analysis of Tamil Diaspora Informational Approach .....                      | 81  |
| Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora Approaches as per the Suggested Model .....   | 82  |
| Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora and the TNA Alignment .....                   | 87  |
| Analysis of the Impact on Sri Lanka .....                                    | 89  |
| The Tamil Diaspora Roadmap .....   | 91  |
| Analysis of the obstacles to the Tamil Diaspora Roadmap .....                | 93  |
| CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....                              | 94  |
| Conclusions.....   | 94  |
| Fundamental Findings.....  | 98  |
| Recommendations.....   | 98  |
| National Level Recommendations .....   | 99  |
| International Level Recommendations .....                                    | 100 |
| Avenues for Future Researches .....  | 101 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| APPENDIX A AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF TAMIL DIASPORA GROUPS ..... | 102 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....  | 105 |

## ACRONYMS

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| APPG-T   | All Party Parliamentary Group for Tamils      |
| BTC      | British Tamil Conservatives                   |
| BTF      | British Tamil Forum                           |
| BTLD     | British Tamils for Liberal Democratic         |
| CFA      | Cease Fire Agreement                          |
| CHOGM    | Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting      |
| CSIS     | Canadian Security Intelligence Service        |
| CTC      | Canadian Tamil Congress                       |
| EU       | European Union                                |
| FACT     | Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils |
| GoSL     | Government of Sri Lanka                       |
| GSP      | Generalized System of Preferences             |
| GTF      | Global Tamil Forum                            |
| HT       | Hybrid Threats                                |
| IGO      | Inter-Governmental Organization               |
| INGO     | International Non-Governmental Organization   |
| INTERFET | International Force for East Timor            |
| LTTE     | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam              |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organization            |
| NDP      | New Democrat Party                            |
| NGO      | Non-Governmental Organization                 |
| RCMP     | Royal Canadian Mounted Police                 |
| SLMM     | Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission                  |

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| SPLA   | Sudan People's Liberation Army                |
| SPLM   | Sudan People's Liberation Movement            |
| TAG    | Tamils Against Genocide                       |
| TCC    | Tamil Coordinating Committee                  |
| TEPA   | Tamil Eelam People's Assembly                 |
| TGTE   | Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam       |
| TLP    | Tamils for Labor Party                        |
| TNA    | Tamil National Alliance                       |
| TNC    | Tamil National Council                        |
| TULF   | Tamil United Liberation Front                 |
| TYO    | Tamil Youth Organization                      |
| UDT    | Timorese Democratic Union                     |
| UK     | United Kingdom                                |
| UN     | United Nations                                |
| UNMIK  | UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo   |
| UNTAET | UN Transitional Administration for East Timor |
| U.S.   | United States                                 |
| USTPAC | United States Tamil Political Action Council  |
| WMD    | Weapons of Mass Destruction                   |
| WTM    | World Tamil Movement                          |

## ILLUSTRATIONS

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| Figure 1. Lifecycle of an Insurgency.....                                   | 21   |
| Figure 2. State and Non-State Actors in the Sri Lankan Conflict .....       | 33   |
| Figure 3. LTTE's International Structure prior to the Military Defeat ..... | 36   |
| Figure 4. Lobbying Support for the Eelam Cause in the UK .....              | 44   |
| Figure 5. The LTTE / pro-LTTE Media Network.....                            | 61   |
| Figure 6. Political Structure of the TGTE .....                             | 83   |
| Figure 7. The Tamil Diaspora Roadmap.....                                   | 92   |

## TABLES

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| Table 1. Distribution of the Tamil Diaspora .....                        | 31   |
| Table 2. Summary of Tamil Diaspora Groups .....                          | 42   |
| Table 3. Comparison of Pre and Post 2009 Tamil Diaspora Activities ..... | 84   |

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka is an island nation that for nearly thirty years faced the viciousness unleashed by a secessionist terrorist movement called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), widely known as the Tamil Tigers. The LTTE was considered one of the most dangerous and deadly terrorist movements in the world.<sup>1</sup> Having started in 1976 as a rural guerrilla force, the LTTE adopted a separatist ideology of a separate state for the Tamil minority in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. The LTTE was heavily dependent on its global network during the conflict for fundraising, procurement of arms and ammunition, and propaganda. Its international network effectively used the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in these efforts and the Tamil diaspora became an essential part of the LTTE as a strategic partner in the conflict.<sup>2</sup>

LTTE's organization within Sri Lanka ceased to exist with its military defeat in 2009 but its global network and Tamil diaspora continue to operate. The Tamil diaspora held a worldwide election within the Tamil diaspora community in 2010 to establish a government in exile, which is called the "Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam" (TGTE). The formation of the TGTE is a clear indication of the continued struggle for a separate Tamil state within Sri Lanka. Today, the former LTTE's global network and

---

<sup>1</sup>Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), "Taming the Tamil Tigers: From here in the U.S.," [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil\\_tigers011008](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008) (accessed 21 September 2013).

<sup>2</sup>Wikipedia, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation\\_Tigers\\_of\\_Tamil\\_Eelam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam) (accessed 21 September 2013).

Tamil diaspora continue to pose a threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka through continually promoting separatist ideology.<sup>3</sup>

With the defeat of the LTTE, not many Tamils within Sri Lanka want to fight for a separate state. Instead, most of the local Tamils are more practical and are prepared to settle for a solution which guarantees the Tamil cultural and social values. Their focus is for some autonomy and self-governance for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka within a united framework and improvement for Tamil people.<sup>4</sup> However, the Tamil diaspora's goal goes beyond this scope. The Tamil diaspora does not seem to be satisfied with "some autonomy." Deep rooted causes of the ethnic conflict could be the loss of rights, a feeling of being in forced exile, and 30 years of living with a separatist mentality. The impact and effectiveness of the Tamil diaspora advocacy for a separate state in Sri Lanka for the Tamil people are not yet known and are therefore an important area of study.

### Historical Background

Sri Lanka has appeared in chronicled history as early as 3000 B.C. The Indian epic Ramayana referred to Sri Lanka in a mythical encounter which resulted in Rama invading Sri Lanka in 3000 B.C. to rescue his wife. The great chronicle Mahawansa related the arrival of the South Indian Prince Vijaya to Sri Lanka in the fifth century B.C. to colonize the country. However, there had been early and constant migration of Tamils

---

<sup>3</sup>Ministry of Defense, "Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network," 2, [http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE\\_international\\_network.html](http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE_international_network.html) (accessed 21 September 2013).

<sup>4</sup>International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186* (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2010), 17, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the-ltte.aspx> (accessed 29 September 2013).

to Sri Lanka for trade ground even before the arrival of Prince Vijaya. Buddhism arrived in Sri Lanka in 300 B.C. from India and this was the principal influence on the lifestyle, culture, language, education, society and identity of the Sinhalese people in Sri Lanka. The proximity to India and ancient relations contributed in many ways for successive Tamil invasions by South Indian kings from the fourth century B.C. to the tenth century A.D.<sup>5</sup>

Later, Portuguese maritime explorers arrived in 1505 and established a colony in Sri Lanka. The Dutch were the next to come to Sri Lanka in 1619 in search of the profitable spice trade in the Indian Ocean region. They defeated the Portuguese and ruled the coastal areas until the British defeated them in 1796. The British did not manage to fully subjugate Sri Lanka until 1815 when the Kandyan Convention was signed. The signing of the convention with Kandyan nobles brought Sri Lanka completely under the rule of the British monarch. Out of many British brokered reforms, the Colebrooke – Cameron Reform of 1831 – 1832 could be considered especially significant in Sri Lankan history. This reform proposed a divided administrative system along cultural and ethnic lines of Sinhalese and Tamils and established the Legislative Council for the representatives of the Sinhalese, Burgher, and Tamil peoples.<sup>6</sup> The British goal was decentralized control of a divided people.

The British used Sri Lanka to cultivate coffee, which demanded a considerable labor force that could not be met locally. This vacuum was filled by Southern Indian

---

<sup>5</sup>Federal Research Division (FRD), “Country Studies: Sri Lanka,” <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html#lk0014> (accessed 22 September 2013).

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

Tamil laborers who began arriving in 1830. These Tamil laborers migrated to and from the country during the harvest seasons. Plant disease caused the downfall of the coffee cultivation which made the British focus on cultivating tea in large plantations. This demanded a larger permanent labor force. This was filled again by South Indian Tamil laborers who permanently migrated to Sri Lanka in large numbers with their families and largely settled down in the hill country areas. The mass arrival of Southern Indian Tamils created a distinct population group in Sri Lanka different from the Sri Lankan Tamils. Representation for the South Indian Tamils was also included in the Legislative Council in the 1924 reforms,<sup>7</sup> further reducing the political power of the Sinhala majority.

National resurgence inspired by the Sinhalese Buddhist movements occurred later in Sri Lanka. As a result, the British reformed the constitution, allowing Sinhalese participation in the Legislative Council while retaining the practice of communal representation for the other seats. The Donoughmore Commission in 1927 allowed further reforms, adding franchises and allowing Sri Lankans in the State Council. However, this system lacked a national political approach, instead focusing on splinter politics. This sparked a division of nationalism ideology, forming separate political parties for Sinhalese, Burghers, Ceylon Indians and Ceylon Tamils. The Soulbury Commission in 1944 recommended dominion status for Ceylon. However, at the end of World War II, both the pressure from Ceylon for political reforms and the British promise to full participatory government to Ceylon after World War II, led negotiations for full independence and in 1948 Ceylon gained independence.<sup>8</sup> Overall, British policies

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

and practices increased the sectarian divisions, especially between the Sinhalese and Tamil peoples, disproportionately favoring the Tamil minority politically and economically.

#### Period from Independence to the Defeat of the LTTE

Following independence, many political and constitutional changes took place. Ethnically based representation of the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority served as key factors during these changes. The governments remained dominated by the Sinhala, and Tamil claims of unequal representation increased over the time. In 1956, eight years after independence, the Sri Lankan Government established Sinhala, the language of the majority, as the official language of the country, requiring it for government jobs. This created tension within the Tamil community as a threatened deprivation of participation in government jobs and education. Many attempts were made by the Tamil leadership to negotiate with the government to protect Tamil rights, to have increased representation and also to have a degree of control of areas on the island dominated by the Tamils.<sup>9</sup> Tamils saw the 1972 adoption of “Sri Lanka” in place of “Ceylon” as another unilateral attempt to marginalize Tamils by the majority Sinhalese.<sup>10</sup> Continuing attempts by Tamil leaders to revive Tamil nationalism and grievances met with no success and apparently

---

<sup>9</sup>Encyclopedia of Nations, “Sri Lanka–History,” <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Sri-Lanka-HISTORY.html> (accessed 25 September 2013).

<sup>10</sup>Wilson A. Jeyaratnam, “The Breakup of Sri Lanka: The Sinhala Tamil Conflict,” <http://tamilnation.co/books/Eelam/wilson.htm> (accessed 25 September 2013).

Tamil leaders succumbed to the separatist and extremist ideology of radical Tamils who resorted to violence as a solution to the problem.<sup>11</sup>

Velupillai Prabhakaran founded the LTTE organization on 5 May 1976 and sought to gain control in the Tamil-dominant northern and eastern parts of the country. His intention was to form a separate state, or “Tamil Eelam,” for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>12</sup> Prabhakaran virtually hijacked the moderate Tamil nationalist approach to the problem and replaced it with a separatist approach. India provided covert support to the LTTE during the initial period based on southern India’s shared kinship with Tamils in north Sri Lanka and other geopolitical objectives.<sup>13</sup> The LTTE resorted to armed violence including terrorism, suicide attacks against military, economic and civilian targets, and the assassination of key military and political figures. From 1983 to its defeat in 2009, the LTTE evolved from a guerilla force to a semi-conventional force.<sup>14</sup> During the period, the LTTE developed its organization locally and internationally, and managed to maintain a land, sea, and small air force.<sup>15</sup> The LTTE eliminated Tamil political leaders and parties who proposed moderate views and opposed the separatist ideology and also

---

<sup>11</sup>FRD, “Country Studies: Sri Lanka.”

<sup>12</sup>Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “Terrorism: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” [http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/liberation\\_tigers\\_te1.asp](http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/liberation_tigers_te1.asp) (accessed 28 September 2013).

<sup>13</sup>Rohan Gunaratna, *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies* (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993).

<sup>14</sup>Anti-Defamation League (ADL), “Terrorism: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”

<sup>15</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006–May 2009* (Colombo: Ministry of Defense, 2011), 6.

was responsible for killing many Sinhala and Tamil political personalities who directly opposed it. These included the killing of two prominent political figures, Ranasinghe Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka, and Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.<sup>16</sup> The killing of India's Premier resulted in the end of Indian support to the LTTE.

An LTTE attack in 1983 in northern Sri Lanka, killing thirteen soldiers, sparked ethnic tension in the country and extremist Sinhala elements resorted to violence against the Tamil community. Many Tamils fled the country and took up permanent residence in other countries with many settling in western countries. Although there was considerable Tamil migration prior to 1983 for personal and economic reasons, the ethnic riots of 1983 dramatically changed the character of this "Tamil diaspora" community. Most of them came to view the Sri Lankan Government and Sinhala majority as having denied Tamils their security and rights.

The LTTE then used this community to establish its international network. The LTTE canvassed Tamil diaspora support to strengthen the organization financially and politically and to promote its Eelam ideology abroad.<sup>17</sup> The LTTE activities were mainly focused on developed countries. The LTTE's fighting machine largely depended on fundraising efforts by the Tamil diaspora. Large sums of money collected willingly or unwillingly extorted from diaspora Tamils and in the guise of charity, were utilized to procure weapons, explosives, equipment, and technologies to wage the war in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora established a wide overseas propaganda network and this helped the

---

<sup>16</sup>Ministry of Defense, "The LTTE in Brief," <http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2013).

<sup>17</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186.*

LTTE carry its voice into the international arena. The LTTE had at least 12 international offices abroad.<sup>18</sup>

Many Sri Lankan Governments negotiated with the LTTE in attempts to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem. At least five separate peace negotiations were initiated, beginning in 1985. Two initiatives were facilitated by India and Norway, both of which had significant Tamil populations. None of these initiatives met with tangible results as the LTTE had no desire to discuss any solution to the problem other than establishing a separate state. However, the LTTE did benefit from the negotiations, using the breathing space given by peace talks to strengthen its forces by recruiting and training. Further, this time was used to neutralize or destroy opposing Tamil political parties and leaders.<sup>19</sup>

In 2002, the Sri Lankan Government signed a Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE with the intention of coming to a permanent solution. The Norwegian Government was invited to act as facilitator of talks between the two parties. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was established to monitor the agreement. However, the LTTE put forward its pre-requisites of acceptance of the Tamil Homeland concept making progress virtually impossible. After attending talks with the Sri Lanka Government representatives in Thailand, Norway, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, the LTTE pulled out from the talks and put forward brand new preconditions to include opening of a land route from Vavuniya to Jaffna in the final round of talks held in Switzerland, making further negotiations practically impossible.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>18</sup>ADL, “Terrorism: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.”

<sup>19</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 28-29, 36.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

During the CFA from 2002 to 2007 the LTTE committed 3,830 violations as recorded by the SLMM. They also used foreign visits meant for peace negotiations to procure weapons and equipment, recruit persons to the organization, strengthen international activities, provoke government security forces and intimidate civilians. The Sri Lankan Government avoided military responses many times but the LTTE's provocations continued. For instance, in 2006 the LTTE closed a sluice gate in the eastern province preventing the water supply to irrigate the paddy cultivations of Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim farmers. The LTTE was not in agreement to reopen the sluice gate, which was the lifeline of civilians in the area. The government had to reopen this sluice gate using military force on humanitarian grounds. Continued violence against civilians forced the government to launch a humanitarian operation in the east and north of the country to liberate the people from the LTTE's grip. These operations commenced in July 2006 and concluded in May 2009 with the military defeat of the LTTE and the end of a near thirty-year war.<sup>21</sup>

### Importance of the Study

The defeat of the LTTE insurgency in May 2009 by the Sri Lankan military forces is a very rare event in history. Few governments have faced a secessionist movement as strong and established as the LTTE and even fewer have been successful in defeating it militarily. However, a military defeat alone has not guaranteed lasting peace in Sri Lanka. Even though the military arm of the LTTE ceased to exist within Sri Lanka, the Tamil diaspora remains intact. Such elements continued to promote the Tamil separatist

---

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 40-42.

ideology and aims to re-establish the demand for a separate state of Tamil Eelam for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka through political and diplomatic means. The “Tamil Eelam” is not the end objective of the majority of the Tamil community living in Sri Lanka at this point but it remains the goal of the Tamil diaspora.<sup>22</sup> As such, this study is also important to understand how an external actor may influence and manipulate a local population to achieve its objectives.

The present peace building efforts in Sri Lanka face many local and international challenges. Addressing the political aspirations of the minority Tamil community is the largest local challenge which has an even greater international focus. On the one hand, members of the Tamil diaspora use their ethnic relationship with local Tamil communities in Sri Lanka to advance their political aspirations for a separate state. On the other hand, they use different means from the violence of the LTTE to acquire international attention and support for the Sri Lankan Tamil aspirations. This is done by projecting the allegation of continued discrimination of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The various means used range from political and diplomatic to the use of propaganda.

As such, it is significant to study the dimensions of the Tamil diaspora to understand how external members of a minority population may continue to struggle for the separatism cause. This study will further try to recognize how such an organization could use different approaches other than the application of threat and violence to further its goals. This study may serve as a model to understand several facets of an insurgency, separatism, military defeat, organizational defeat, and the importance of external support

---

<sup>22</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, 17.

elements, trends, and the use of non-traditional approaches to regain insurgent or separatist aspirations.

### Research Question

The insurgent's use of tactics to achieve its final objectives is varied. The LTTE believed in and used a terror and military campaign focused on separatism but failed to achieve its goal. Its successor, the pro-separatist segments in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, uses a political and diplomatic campaign that has gained some momentum. The new and liberal framing concepts of states, nations, sovereignty, democracy, fundamental rights, human rights, media dimensions, and international law instruments that prevail in today's world have given opportunities for insurgencies to pursue non-traditional approaches in gaining their objectives. Therefore, the primary question is; how will the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora contribute to separatism in Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE? In accordance with the primary question, the following secondary questions were developed:

1. What is the strategic importance of the Tamil diaspora in the post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka?
2. What approaches are used by the Tamil diaspora and how do they use such approaches to achieve separatism in Sri Lanka?
3. Do these endeavors pose a significant threat to the sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka?

## Scope

The research is primarily focused on the “pro-separatist Tamil diaspora,” which is only a segment of the total Tamil diaspora community. The term “Tamil diaspora” throughout this research largely refers to this segment. Further, the research was focused on a few countries where the Tamil presence is significant. The researcher did not focus on India as the Tamil diaspora activities in India cannot be presented separately from the internal politics of the Tamil Nadu. The researcher selected Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (U.S.) as the countries most important to study. Selections of the above countries were based on the following aspects:

1. The proportionately high influence and activities of the Tamil diaspora in those countries in terms of “political-diplomatic” and “informational” efforts.
2. The influence wielded by those countries on Sri Lankan politics and Sri Lanka’s economy.
3. The influence of those countries in regional and international affairs as significant and leading actors and as English speaking governments.
4. The availability and accessibility to literature on the Tamil diaspora and their activities in those countries.

## Limitations

This research focused on the Tamil diaspora’s approach of separatism, activities of the Tamil diaspora in countries where their presence is significant, the availability of literature and availability of time. The following are the limitations of this research:

1. The aspects of insurgency are always evolving. The traditional insurgency organizations and approaches have now changed making the present environment more

complex. Different insurgent groups follow their own principles, rules, and approaches.

This research will only focus on the Tamil diaspora’s “non-violent”, “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches.

2. The researcher will not focus on the radical and perceived “violent” approaches by some Tamils diaspora groups.

3. This research will detail activities of the Tamil diaspora in three countries only. However, Tamil diaspora expansion is not limited to those countries. The Tamil diaspora distribution is worldwide.

4. This is an individual research and the researcher will use only available literature to complete the research.

5. The researcher will not have the liberty to access the members of the Tamil diaspora to get their opinions. The literature available in the open domain and assumed to be promoting the Eelam ideology is used as a reflection of the opinions of the Tamil diaspora.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The subject covers a range of literature to include books, publications, manuals, articles, and other writings. The diaspora activities and its role during and after conflicts are not a new phenomenon in the world. These groups play a vital role in the conflict of their country of origin.<sup>23</sup> Chapter 2 will bring together the literature related to concepts of statehood, sovereignty and homeland, which the LTTE mainly focuses on throughout the conflict, insurgency and separatism, which the LTTE applied to gain its objectives, lifecycle of insurgencies, explanations for diaspora, the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora, their links and alliances, the Tamil diaspora's international dimensions, use of political tools by it to lobby and canvas its Eelam cause, and the use of same to promote separatism in Sri Lanka. Further, this chapter will bring literature related to some successful separatist movements namely from East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan to identify the "political-diplomatic" and "informational" models used in those cases.

#### Concepts of State, Statehood, Sovereignty and Homeland

The term "state" has evolved since time immemorial and it could be very broadly defined as a body, a nation and / or a landmass or a territory, organized as a political

---

<sup>23</sup>Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, *Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006), 1, [http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFile%2FISN%2F16804%2Fipublicationdocument\\_singledocument%2F2d1dba5f-be99-4719-8a52-610398f892fa%2Fen%2Fdiaspora\\_conflict\\_resolution.pdf&ei=hbpfUvG0JOPi2QWB0oDIBA&usg=AFQjCNFmRMx7Ov4Ib-MDTvbH\\_Y3vrDOGmw](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFile%2FISN%2F16804%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F2d1dba5f-be99-4719-8a52-610398f892fa%2Fen%2Fdiaspora_conflict_resolution.pdf&ei=hbpfUvG0JOPi2QWB0oDIBA&usg=AFQjCNFmRMx7Ov4Ib-MDTvbH_Y3vrDOGmw) (accessed 4 October 2013).

entity under one government system. Canons of International Law written in 1930 by Thomas Baty defined “state” as a body of organized people or an assemblage of human beings among whom the will of an ascertainable number habitually prevails.<sup>24</sup> As comprehensively elaborated by Pasquale Fiore, “the state is an association of a considerable number of men living within a definite territory, constituted in fact as a political society and subject to the supreme authority of a sovereign, who has the power, ability and means to maintain the political organization of the association, with the assistance of the law, and to regulate and protect the rights of the members, to conduct relations with other states and to assume responsibility for its acts.”<sup>25</sup>

The state has four distinct characteristics: a permanent population, occupation of a defined territory, an organized government and the ability and capacity to engage in foreign relations with other states to include obligations for compliance to international law.<sup>26</sup> This very criteria is recognized in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, also known as the “Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933” as the requisite for “statehood.”<sup>27</sup> Sovereignty is simply the exclusive power or authority over a state. In relation to a state, sovereignty can be defined as a political philosophy which administers,

---

<sup>24</sup>Thomas D. Grant, “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents,” <http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup13/Defining%20Statehood,%20The%20Montevideo%20Convention%20and%20its%20Discontents.pdf> (accessed 4 October 2013), 409.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Department of State, Department of State Publication 8484, *Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American) 26 December 1933* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/intam03.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp) (accessed 4 October 2013), 4.

<sup>27</sup>Grant, 403.

exercises power and authority, makes decisions and maintains order over a defined territory, or state.<sup>28</sup> Irrespective of the form of the government, sovereignty is the key to overcome instabilities and disorders over not only one's territory but also over its population.<sup>29</sup>

The concept of "homeland" is tied with geographic territory, history and ethnic or cultural identity. As defined by Yusuf Yaylaci "a homeland is the concept of the territory (cultural geography) to which an ethnic group holds a long history and a deep cultural association with the country in which a particular national identity began. As a common noun, it simply connotes the country of one's origin."<sup>30</sup> Even though a homeland intrinsically focuses on geography,<sup>31</sup> the concept also focuses on the values and elements

---

<sup>28</sup>Encyclopedia Britannica, "Sovereignty," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/557065/sovereignty> (accessed 4 October 2013).

<sup>29</sup>Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, ed., *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 5-8, Reproduced U.S. Command and General Staff College. C 204 Reading A, "Some Framing Concepts for Strategic Understanding" (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2013), 1.

<sup>30</sup>Yusuf Yaylaci, "Denotation of the concept of Homeland in Western British and American Cultural and Linguistic Contexts," *Anadolu University Journal of Social Science* (Turkey: Anadolu University, 2008), 199, [http://www.academia.edu/541250/DENOTATIONS\\_OF\\_THE\\_CONCEPT\\_OF\\_HOME LAND\\_IN\\_WESTERN\\_BRITISH\\_AND\\_AMERICAN\\_CULTURAL\\_AND\\_LINGUISTIC\\_CONTEXTS](http://www.academia.edu/541250/DENOTATIONS_OF_THE_CONCEPT_OF_HOME LAND_IN_WESTERN_BRITISH_AND_AMERICAN_CULTURAL_AND_LINGUISTIC_CONTEXTS) (accessed 4 October 2013).

<sup>31</sup>Richard L. Nostrand and Lawrence E. Estaville Jr, ed., "Introduction: The Homeland Concept," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 13, no. 2 (1993): 1-4, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08873639309478384#preview> (accessed 4 October 2013).

of national identity in relation to the native language in practice by the ethnic or cultural group in that geographic territory.<sup>32</sup>

### Concepts of Insurgency and Separatism

Insurgency can be identified as an action focused on forced political change in a country or state by a non-state organization through the application of diverse approaches including subversion, propaganda and military force. The British doctrinal definition of insurgency is “an organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority.”<sup>33</sup> The U.S. joint doctrine adds that an insurgency is “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”<sup>34</sup> It should also be noted that both the British and the U.S. doctrines focus on insurgencies intent to overthrow a government or a state and not largely separatist movements. Insurgents commonly employ a range of tactics to include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organizations and international activity to achieve their aims.<sup>35</sup> Insurgents

---

<sup>32</sup>Yaylaci.

<sup>33</sup>Ministry of Defense, *British Army Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency* (London: Ministry of Defense, 2009), Chapter 1, 5, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16\\_11\\_09\\_army\\_manual.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf) (accessed 5 October 2013).

<sup>34</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), Chapter 1, 1. <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2013).

<sup>35</sup>Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency,” <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2013), 2.

largely believe in their political objectives and focus on achieving those political objectives by any means though not necessarily by violent ones but also through legal or political means.<sup>36</sup>

Extensive use of propaganda as a tool to achieve their objectives is a common modus operandi of the insurgencies.<sup>37</sup> A hybrid threat is defined as a “diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and / or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.”<sup>38</sup> Media, propaganda and information warfare is regularly used by hybrid threats to achieve strategic advantages. These efforts are used either to control or manipulate information to its own advantage and it can be diplomatic, political, economic or military in nature. These efforts are aimed at shaping of international actors in terms of global decision makers and their decisions to align with the objectives of the hybrid threats.<sup>39</sup>

All insurgent movements are driven by a set of factors or characteristics which include the leadership, objectives, ideology, environment, external support, and phasing.<sup>40</sup> The cause is the main driving force of any insurgent organization and cause is best founded on unresolved grievances existing within any society or culture.<sup>41</sup> The

---

<sup>36</sup>Ministry of Defense, *British Army Field Manual*, Chapter 2, 1

<sup>37</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Chapter 1, 4.

<sup>38</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 7-100, *Hybrid Threats* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), Chapter 3, 5.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Chapter 1, 13.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 10.

typical causes used by insurgents are nationalism and ethnic, tribal or religious grievances.<sup>42</sup>

The effects of insurgency are not limited to a country. Its effect can be found in the regions or worldwide where similar cultural or religious groups exist. This is especially visible within diaspora and expatriate communities. Insurgencies keep their political ideology alive with the use of networks of people and use advanced technology and media to link them. External support has always been an enormous drive to insurgencies. This can either be in terms of state support, or non-state actors support such as expatriates or diaspora. Support from a diaspora is significant as it could provide the insurgents with international funding, arms and technical expertise. Further it could use the politics of the country of residence to support its cause and to distort messages of the country of origin. Insurgents also use an array of non-state actors to their advantage and these groups can either be other insurgent groups and / or influential individuals.<sup>43</sup>

There are several forms of insurgencies and separatism is the most common one. Separatists believe in gaining some measure of sovereignty over their area. Separatists often desire to achieve such sovereignty based on their ethnicity in the form of either internal autonomy or full independence.<sup>44</sup> The area that separatists generally seek may

---

<sup>42</sup>Ministry of Defense, *British Army Field Manual*, Chapter 2, 3.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., Chapter 2, 1-3.

<sup>44</sup>Robert T. Gurr and Harff Barbara, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 139.

extend beyond national boundaries.<sup>45</sup> They believe the state power as the goal, focus on self-determination and act to obtain power either through peaceful or violent means.<sup>46</sup> These entities not only organize locally in their “homeland” but also in diaspora and expatriate communities in countries abroad.<sup>47</sup> The separatists also try to seek gaining a state for themselves as that would assist them achieving political sovereignty or independence and self-governance.<sup>48</sup>

#### Lifecycle of an Insurgent Movement

Even though the characteristics may differ from one group to another, insurgencies follow a common lifecycle. However, it is not necessary for an insurgency movement to pass through each cycle. Broadly, the stages in the cycle are pre-insurgency stage; incipient conflict stage; open insurgency stage; and resolution stage.<sup>49</sup> Figure 1 indicates the lifecycle of an insurgency.

---

<sup>45</sup>Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL), *Guide to Analysis of Insurgency–2012* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 3, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599> (accessed 11 October 2013).

<sup>46</sup>Metta Spencer, ed., *Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 44.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 51.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>49</sup>HSDL, *Guide to Analysis of Insurgency–2012*, 5




Figure 1. Lifecycle of an Insurgency

Source: Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL), *Guide to Analysis of Insurgency–2012* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012), 22.

1. Pre-insurgency stage. Activities in this stage are underground and open activities are non-violent and of a political nature. The movement is beginning to organize, create leadership, establish cause and identity, recruit members, and stockpile arms and ammunition.<sup>50</sup>
2. Incipient conflict stage. In this stage the movement begins to demonstrate violence. They try to use this stage to project their presence, canvass the cause, rally the

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 5.

support from others, and to instigate government actions. The use of highly asymmetric and terrorist tactics such as kidnapping, bombing and assassinations are evident in this stage.<sup>51</sup>

3. Open insurgency stage. The insurgent movement acts openly in this stage. On the political front they will overtly challenge the government authority and exert their control over the territory. On the military front they will stage more frequent, aggressive, violent, sophisticated and larger scale attacks.<sup>52</sup>

a. Political factors. The insurgent movements will try to undermine state control and replace it with a shadow government by infiltrating their sympathizers into the system. As they control and provide the social, administrative and judicial services they will act themselves as a *de facto* government.<sup>53</sup>

b. Military factors. The military faction will conduct more frequent attacks employing terrorist and guerrilla tactics, attacks on military and police establishments, government infrastructure and utilities. They will increase the use of rate, size, sophistication, geographic extension of attacks, type of targets, employment of modern weapons and equipment.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., 13-14.

c. External assistance. External support from outside actors will be evident during this stage. Such assistance may include diplomatic, financial, arms, non-lethal equipment, sanctuary, intelligence, training, or advisers and patron assistance.<sup>55</sup>

4. Resolution stage. The resolution can either be a victory for the insurgents; a negotiated settlement; or a government victory. On an average, 36 percent concluded with an insurgent victory, nearly 28 percent concluded with mixed outcomes with parties reaching a compromise and approximately 36 percent concluded with a government victory.<sup>56</sup>

#### Concept adopted by the LTTE

The LTTE was a secessionist movement which fought for a separate and independent state (Eelam) in Sri Lanka for the Tamil minority community and used terrorism and a long military campaign against the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) as its primary methodology.<sup>57</sup> The Vaddukoddai Resolution unanimously adopted on 14 May 1976 during the first national convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in Sri Lanka under S. J. V. Chelyanayakam first brought the concept of a separate state named “Eelam.” This resolution promoted the Tamil nationalism and

---

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>57</sup>IHS Jane’s, *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)* (IHS Jane’s, 2013), 1.

discussed the grievances of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The basic principles of the resolution were:<sup>58</sup>

1. Identification of Tamil nationality as a separate ethnic entity.
2. Rights of Tamils in Sri Lanka to self-determination.
3. Rights of a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka.

However, this approach of the TULF was not welcomed by the GoSL. Tamil militancy was rising during this time and they adopted the very ideology of the TULF. The LTTE was the dominant force out of a number of Tamil militant groups. The LTTE portrayed themselves as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking community and subsequently took over the leadership of the campaign.<sup>59</sup> The LTTE's main aim and objective had always been the establishment of a separate, independent homeland for Tamil people in the northern and eastern parts of the country where the ethnic Tamils were a significant segment of the population.<sup>60</sup> Since the LTTE's initiation of a military campaign, many governments in Sri Lanka attempted to negotiate with it, with three direct talks between the GoSL and the LTTE and two peace initiatives mediated by India and Norway. However, all these attempts were futile as the LTTE was unwilling to

---

<sup>58</sup>Ilankai Tamil Sangam, "Vaddukoddai Resolution," [http://www.sangam.org/FB\\_HIST\\_DOCS/vaddukod.htm](http://www.sangam.org/FB_HIST_DOCS/vaddukod.htm) (accessed 11 October 2013).

<sup>59</sup>Wilson A. Jeyaratnam, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 2000), 114, <http://books.google.com/books?id=W3aAB9IFVdkC&pg=PA114#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 11 October 2013).

<sup>60</sup>IHS Jane's, *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, 2.

negotiate for anything short of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE's demands throughout the period were:<sup>61</sup>

1. The recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality.
2. The recognition of the rights of the Tamils to an identified Tamil homeland.
3. The recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation.
4. The recognition of the right to full citizenship of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka.

#### Political Representations of the LTTE Ideology

The LTTE organizational structure formed with two main wings, a military, and a political wing. The LTTE political wing carried out the civil administration in the LTTE-controlled areas and the intention was to seamlessly transition into a civilian government if the LTTE goal of an Eelam state was established.<sup>62</sup> In addition, the LTTE used the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which was a legal Tamil mainstream political alliance in Sri Lanka to voice its cause outside the areas it directly controlled. The TNA by and large acted as an unofficial political arm of the LTTE and the voice for the LTTE in the parliament of Sri Lanka.<sup>63</sup> The LTTE leader met with TNA parliamentarians from time to time to negotiate his proposals with the Sri Lankan Governments.<sup>64</sup> Even after the defeat of the LTTE, the TNA continues to dwell on the LTTE demands. The TNA's current

---

<sup>61</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 28-30.

<sup>62</sup>Aljazeera, “The History of the Tamil Tigers,” <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/2008112019115851343.html> (accessed 30 November 2013).

<sup>63</sup>Sunday Observer, “TNA Manifesto contains Prabhakaran’s Policies,” <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/09/08/pol03.asp> (accessed 30 November 2013).

<sup>64</sup>Daily Mirror, “Prabha talks peace with TNA MPs,” <http://archives.dailymirror.lk/2004/04/21/front/1.asp> (accessed 30 November 2013).

political manifesto and stand on the political solution for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka stressed the following points:<sup>65</sup>

1. The Tamil people are a distinct nationality and have inhabited the island of Sri Lanka together with the Sinhalese people and others.
2. The contiguous preponderantly Tamil speaking northern and eastern provinces are the historical habitation of the Tamil speaking peoples.
3. The Tamil people are entitled to the rights of self-determination.
4. Power sharing arrangements must be established in a unit of merged northern and eastern provinces based on a federal structure, in a manner also acceptable to the Tamil speaking Muslim people.
5. Devolution of powers should be over land, law and order, socio-economic development including health and education, resources and fiscal powers.
6. Direct foreign investment in the north and east will be facilitated resulting in new industries and other employment opportunities being created for our youth.
7. Avenues for tertiary education will also be set up so that those who cannot enter the universities can pursue higher education in relevant fields.<sup>66</sup>

### Diaspora

The word diaspora initially referred to the dispersed Jewish refugees after the Babylonian exile. It has a link to philosophical, political, and eschatological associations

---

<sup>65</sup>Tamil National Alliance, “Our stand on the Political Solution,” [http://tnapolitics.org/?page\\_id=11&lang=en](http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=11&lang=en) (accessed 30 November 2013).

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

to the Jews and their promised land.<sup>67</sup> “Diaspora” is a Greek word which referred to people of common origin dispersed in a geographical area. It also referred to the movement of such mass from its homeland. There are many kinds of diaspora but the key factor is their strong political bond with their original homeland.<sup>68</sup> There are three core elements in the diaspora. Firstly, their dispersion in the space crosses the borders and can be a forced or otherwise traumatic dispersion. Secondly, their orientation to the “homeland” which is either real or imagined and serve as the source of value, identity and loyalty. Thirdly, the boundary maintained which supports them to distinguish themselves as a “community.” This is crucial for the diaspora as the same cuts across the state boundaries and link diaspora communities in different countries into a single “transnational community.”<sup>69</sup>

### Concept of Ethnie

Ethnie can be defined as ethnic groups that form the background of nations. Usually the ethnic groups are living and acting together. The main characteristics of these ethnic groups are social and cultural values which they share, reinterpret, and express through the time. According to Anthony D. Smith, there are six components of all

---

<sup>67</sup>Encyclopedia of Britannica, “Diaspora,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora> <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora> (accessed 12 October 2013).

<sup>68</sup>Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Ian Skoggard, ed., *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World* (New York: Springer Science and Business Media Inc, 2005), <http://books.google.com/books?id=7QEjPVyd9YMC&printsec=frontcover&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 12 October 2013).

<sup>69</sup>Rogers Brubaker, The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1 (Tayler and Francis Limited, 2005), 5-6, [http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/29\\_Diaspora\\_diaspora\\_ERS.pdf](http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/29_Diaspora_diaspora_ERS.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2013).

ethnies. They have a collective name which provides them an ethnic identity and distinguish themselves from the other ethnies. They have a common myth of descent which explain its birth, expansion, and destiny. This provides the framework for their ethnie and provides them a sense of belonging. Then they have a shared history which serves as the form and moulds of their continuity. The shared history tells the story that pleases and satisfies the narrative and educates the members of the community.<sup>70</sup>

Then there is a distinctive shared culture which binds the members of the ethnie together. These cultural traits may include language, religion, customs, attitudes, values, and lifestyle, to name a few. There is also an association into a specific territory to which they feel ownership. This association can either be physical or emotional. Feeling of territorial ownership is significantly important to ethnie not only because of physical connection but also because of sincerely felt association to that territory and the community in that territory. Lastly, there is a sense of active solidarity. The solidarity leads the ethnie to form together to act collectively when they are faced with stress and danger.<sup>71</sup> The concept of ethnie may probably better explain the core reasons for the diaspora's involvement in ethnic problems.

An ethnie will usually protect and support its own uniqueness. Diaspora connect with ethnie members and groups in domestic populations and support various activities. When ethnies, including those outside the country in diaspora, feel threatened or

---

<sup>70</sup>Dr. Ed Robarge and John Cary, "History and Culture: How the history of an ethnic group affects its values, beliefs, and attitudes," reproduced U.S. Command and General Staff College, Reading C151RC, "Culture and Military Operations" (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2007), 1-3.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

discriminates against, they often respond in organizations, groups, and movements including political and even armed separatist movements. The Tamil population in Sri Lanka and in its broader diaspora is a significant ethnne.

### Diaspora's Contribution in a Conflict

The role of diaspora in conflicts and political unrest are a common phenomenon. The diaspora's contribution to such conflicts was significantly brought to attention after 9/11 with its links to intra-state conflicts, transnational dispersion and possible mobilization possibilities. Diasporas sometimes remain as separatist or fundamentalist entities that continue the conflicts through economic and political support or intervention. The diaspora may collect funds within the transnational communities and may provide economic support for organizations or conflict in the country of origin. Further, direct political support through its transnational networks to the organization in the country of origin is yet another common function. They interchange opinions and knowledge with actors in the homeland and participate in the political processes through participation in advisory councils or governments of transition.

The diaspora also used indirect political support through mobilizing political support among the population and policy makers in their countries of residence or among international organizations. Such activities include the organized public events, demonstrations, meetings and information campaigns. These endeavors are well supported by the lobbying activities abroad. The diaspora keep the issue on its political agenda, contributing to what has been termed a diffusion of domestic politics between homeland and country of residence. Further, the diaspora use media and propaganda in an extensive manner to canvas support. They use open domains as platforms for information

campaigns to mobilize the members of the diaspora, communicate between members in dispersed states and also to expand their popular base. The electronic and printed media also serve as important vehicles for news and political commentary for the diaspora.<sup>72</sup>

### The LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora

The role played by the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was one of the key factors in the Sri Lankan civil war. Since independence in 1948, many Tamils emigrated from Sri Lanka to various places around the world.<sup>73</sup> The 1983 communal riots sparked large-scale Tamil migration and most of these migrants sought political asylum in western countries.<sup>74</sup> Despite the diversity of their date of arrival in the host country, duration of stay, legal status, gender, caste, religion, socio-economic status, and political affiliation, all these communities see themselves as the Tamil diaspora. It is estimated that the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora totals nearly one million with their distribution as illustrated in the table 1:

---

<sup>72</sup>Eva Østergaard-Nielsen, 1, 5, 6-10.

<sup>73</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, 1.

<sup>74</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” 2.

Table 1. Distribution of the Tamil Diaspora

| Serial | Country         | Numbers <sup>75</sup> | Numbers <sup>76</sup> |
|--------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1.     | Canada          | 200,000–300,000       | 380,000               |
| 2.     | India           | 200,000               | 150,000               |
| 3.     | Great Britain   | 180,000               | 300,000               |
| 4.     | Germany         | 60,000                | 60,000                |
| 5.     | Australia       | 40,000                | 40,000                |
| 6.     | Switzerland     | 47,000                | 42,000                |
| 7.     | France          | 40,000–50,000         | 100,000               |
| 8.     | The Netherlands | 20,000                | 15,000                |
| 9.     | U.S.            | 25,000                | 35,000                |
| 10.    | Italy           | 15,000                | 23,000                |
| 11.    | Malaysia        | 20,000                | 20,000                |
| 12.    | Norway          | 10,000                | 12,000                |
| 13.    | Denmark         | 7,000                 | 7,000                 |
| 14.    | New Zealand     | 3,000                 | 3,000                 |
| 15.    | Sweden          | 2,000                 | 2,500                 |
| 16.    | Belgium         |                       | 800                   |
| 17.    | Finland         |                       | 700                   |

Sources: International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2010, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the-ltte.aspx> (accessed 29 September 2013); Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” [http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE\\_international\\_network.html](http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE_international_network.html) (accessed 21 September 2013).

The LTTE made all efforts to control the Tamil diaspora based overseas, establishing a position that they were the sole representative of the Tamils. Most of the

---

<sup>75</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, 1.

<sup>76</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” 2-3.

Tamil diaspora enjoy the social, economic and educational benefits in their host countries and are reluctant to return to Sri Lanka for the same reasons. In addition, these communities create a considerable labor force and also a voting bloc for local politicians. Such situations have cleverly been exploited by the LTTE to its advantage creating a conducive political environment and a funding base through the Tamil diaspora to strengthen the LTTE network and its efforts.<sup>77</sup>

#### The Tamil Diaspora as an Actor in the Sri Lankan Conflict

Even though the Sri Lankan conflict is characterized as an internal conflict, the international community has purposely or inevitably become involved in the conflict in different ways. The actors involved in the conflict can broadly be categorized into two groups, state actors and non-state actors. State actors include regional actors such as India, Pakistan and China and other international actors include the U.S., Canada, and Norway. The important non-state actors are specifically the Tamil diaspora, the United Nations (UN), the Sri Lankan civil society, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) and the international media. There is a complex inter-relationship among the state and non-state actors and focusing on this would be useful to understand the Sri Lankan conflict in the global context. As a result of this globalized context, there was even a prevalence of humanitarian intervention in the Sri Lanka conflict.<sup>78</sup> It is also important to note that there are some other actors such as other

---

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>78</sup>Caroline Hargreaves, Martin Karlsson, Surabhi Agrawal, Jonathan Hootnick, and Katharine Tengtio, *International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Conflict* (Scotland: University of St Andrews, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies), 4,

Tamil militant groups, Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka, and some other state parties such as Tamil Nadu in India. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction of state and non-state actors in Sri Lankan conflict. It is important to note that there are also inter-connected relations to a greater extent.<sup>79</sup>




Figure 2. State and Non-State Actors in the Sri Lankan Conflict

Source: Caroline Hargreaves, Martin Karlsson, Surabhi Agrawal, Jonathan Hootnick, and Katharine Tengtjo, *International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Conflict* (Scotland: University of St Andrews, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies).

---

[http://www.academia.edu/1565798/International\\_Dimensions\\_of\\_the\\_Sri\\_Lankan\\_Conflict](http://www.academia.edu/1565798/International_Dimensions_of_the_Sri_Lankan_Conflict) (accessed 14 October 2013).

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 5.

The LTTE used the Tamil diaspora to raise funds, procure arms, and a range of other activities. The LTTE's case is an example of how an insurgent organization could use the diaspora to its own advantage. The diaspora network was an essential feature of the LTTE's international support structure.<sup>80</sup> The LTTE's fundraising through the diaspora composed of four main areas; direct contribution from the diaspora, funds siphoned-off from NGOs, charity, and donors, human trafficking, and Tamil run businesses and investments.<sup>81</sup> A number of Front Organizations created within the Tamil diaspora collected funds in the guise of donations from the Tamil communities living abroad. Many of the Tamil diaspora contributed willingly to the LTTE but there were also coercive tactics employed by the LTTE in collecting funds for the organization. It is estimated that the LTTE was raising approximately 200 million USD a year from the Tamil diaspora during the conflict.<sup>82</sup>

Activities of the LTTE Front Organizations further extend to procurement and propaganda. Though these tasks of the Front Organizations invariably overlap, there is a significant autonomy of operation in each.<sup>83</sup> Funds collected overseas formed an integral part of the LTTE's National Defense Fund and procurement efforts.<sup>84</sup> During the conflict

---

<sup>80</sup>Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in outside support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 42-43, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf) (accessed 16 October 2013).

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>82</sup>Hargreaves, et al., *International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Conflict*, 22-23.

<sup>83</sup>Ministry of Defense, "Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network," 3.

<sup>84</sup>Byman et al., *Trends in outside support for Insurgent Movements*, 54.

period, the LTTE used the funds collected abroad to procure weapons including small arms, ammunition, mortars, missiles, and explosives. The amount of explosives and mortars transported by the LTTE remains the largest quantity of armaments ever transported by a non-state armed group. Further, this LTTE international network is unmatchable with any other insurgent group in the world.<sup>85</sup> It is reported that eighty to ninety percent of the funds required for the LTTE was collected from overseas sources including the Tamil diaspora and other LTTE owned international investments and businesses.<sup>86</sup> The LTTE owned shipping network supported its procurement network and gun running efforts. It is reported that they had at least 20 ships as floating warehouses and these ships were registered under different flags but staffed by the LTTE operatives.<sup>87</sup> Figure 3 illustrates LTTE's international structure prior to the military defeat.

---

<sup>85</sup>IHS Jane's, *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, 20.

<sup>86</sup>Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Funding the 'Final War: ' LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006), 11, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war-0> (accessed 18 October 2013).

<sup>87</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 23.




Figure 3. LTTE's International Structure prior to the Military Defeat

Source: Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006–May 2009* (Colombo: Ministry of Defense, 2011), 25.

The LTTE's international outfit which operated in at least 40 countries worldwide not only supported the fund raising but was also used to propagate anti-Sri Lankan propaganda to discredit the GoSL and to promote and achieve its Eelam goal.<sup>88</sup> The diaspora is politically organized in cyberspace and worked in two ways; to augment the LTTE military campaign and to raise concerns among other states on the issues of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. This network supported Eelam and is considered more powerful and threatening than the actual military campaign. These networks were used to attach the GoSL and its armed forces to violations against the minority population, to propagate inter communal violence, to propagate the so called racist behavior of the GoSL, and to promote the LTTE's image citing its victories and achievements in the war.

<sup>88</sup>IHS Jane's, *Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism*, 19.

Further, these propaganda networks carried out academic analysis to justify its struggle and the separatism cause.<sup>89</sup> The magnitude of the LTTE propaganda helped the LTTE to gain a high degree of legitimacy in many Western states and to represent themselves as a genuine national liberation movement which engaged in a legitimate independence struggle.<sup>90</sup>

#### The Tamil Diaspora after the Defeat of the LTTE

The LTTE was militarily defeated on Sri Lankan soil in May 2009. The Tamil diaspora had to accept the defeat of the LTTE and the failure of the LTTE's military approach to achieve an independent Tamil state. As such, the Tamil diaspora next believed in a non-violent political phase to win their demands. However, the new strategy is still focusing on the ultimate goal of achieving an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The post-war Tamil issues raised by the pro-LTTE groups such as Tamil internment and the military occupation of the north reinforced the continuous demand for a separate state and the same has been used to recruit new supporters to the cause. Some in the diaspora believe a separate state will be the only justice possible for Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>91</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup>Athulasiri Kumara Samarakoon, "Ethnic Wars on Cyberspace: Case of Tamil Tigers and the Majoritarian Sinhalese State in Sri Lanka" (The 3rd International Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences, Thailand, Prince of Songkla University, 2011), 3-6, <http://sv.libarts.psu.ac.th/conference5/proceedings/Proceedings3/article/5pdf/004.pdf> (accessed 19 October 2013).

<sup>90</sup>Byman et al., *Trends in outside support for Insurgent Movements*, 47.

<sup>91</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, 12.

After the military defeat of the LTTE, two major Tamil diaspora factions emerged. One was formed in May 2009 and consisted of Tamil diaspora intellectuals led by Kumaran Pathmanathan, the former LTTE procurement chief, whilst the other formed in June 2009 consisted of hardcore LTTE followers led by Nediyawan. The main policy difference of these two groups is that the Tamil diaspora intellectuals focused on a political and diplomatic struggle whilst the other group continued to focus on a radical LTTE ideology. The arrest of Kumaran Pathmanathan in August 2009, led Viswanadan Rudrakumaran, the former legal advisor of the LTTE, to take over the leadership of the Tamil diaspora intellectuals' faction. Two other factions; one led by Fr. S.J. Emmanuel, a Tamil diaspora extremist, and one led by Vinayagam, a senior LTTE intelligence leader who fled the country in 2009, were also formed during this period.<sup>92</sup>

#### The Present Tamil Diaspora International Structure

The present Tamil diaspora organizations can be grouped into five separate branches. Those are the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE); the Global Tamil Forum (GTF); the British Tamil Forum (BTF); Tamil Eelam People's Assembly (TEPA) cum Tamil National Council (TNC); and Ex-combatant / Intelligence group.<sup>93</sup> The activities of each and every group are highlighted below in order to understand their goals and interests:

1. Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE): The TGTE was formed in May 2009 by Kumaran Pathmanathan and later under the leadership of Viswanadan

---

<sup>92</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*, 2-3.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid.

Rudrakumaran who is based in the U.S.A. It has a wide network with offices in almost all European countries where a significant population of the Tamil diaspora live. The TGTE held an election in May 2010 to elect 135 members to its “Government in Exile.” They held three sessions in the U.S.A. in which Viswanadan Rudrakumaran and 22 other elected members were appointed respectively as Prime Minister and Ministers.<sup>94</sup> The TGTE is focusing on winning freedom for the Tamil people on the basis of the political principles of nationhood, homeland and right of self-determination. The objectives of the TGTE are mainly focused on the basis of the Vaddukoddai Resolution and the TGTE is to work in partnership with local Tamils in Sri Lanka to actualize its objectives. Further, the TGTE is to establish diplomatic links with the foreign governments and to articulate positions for negotiations with the Sinhala nation<sup>95</sup> (the detailed aims and objectives of the TGTE are given in appendix A).

2. Global Tamil Forum (GTF): The GTF was formed in February 2010 under the leadership of Fr. S.J. Emmanuel who is based in Europe. He is a very close companion of the former LTTE leader and a Tamil extremist engaged in a vicious propaganda campaign against the GoSL.<sup>96</sup> The GTF poses as an independent international entity and derives strength from diaspora Tamils and follows the principles of democracy and a non-violent approach. They work to restore the Tamil peoples’ right to self-determination and democratic self-rule in their traditional homeland in the island of Sri Lanka. The GTF

---

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>95</sup>Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), “Mission Statement,” <http://www.tgte-us.org/mission.html> (accessed 18 November 2013).

<sup>96</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*, 4.

aims to use all resources available to the Tamil diaspora to establish the Tamil people's right to self-determination and their right to re-establish their nationhood.<sup>97</sup> (the detailed aims and objectives of the GTF are given in appendix A).

3. British Tamil Forum (BTF): The BTF is an organization established in 2006 in the UK led by Suren Surendiran. The main focus of this group is to gain the support of the Tamil diaspora and local politicians in the UK for the Eelam cause. The BTF is working side by side with the GTF in pursuing common objectives.<sup>98</sup> The mission of the BTF is also focusing and canvassing mainstream decision makers in the UK on the right to self-determination of the Tamil people within the democratic framework defined by the international law instruments.<sup>99</sup> (the detailed aims and objectives of the BTF are given in appendix A).

4. Tamil Eelam People's Assembly (TEPA) cum Tamil National Council (TNC): TEPA / TNC is an organization inaugurated in June 2009 by a person named Nediyawan and is based in Europe. This organization controls most of the LTTE assets. TEPA / TNC also controls most of the Tamil schools overseas which are used to inculcate Tamil sentiments in the second and third generation diaspora Tamils.<sup>100</sup> Nediyawan is appearing

---

<sup>97</sup>Global Tamil Forum (GTF), “Vision and Mission,” <http://globaltamilforum.org/gtf/content/about-gtf> (accessed 18 November 2013).

<sup>98</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat – June 2012*, 5.

<sup>99</sup>British Tamil Forum (BTF), “British Tamil Forum: Working for Pease with Justice and Dignity,” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about/> (accessed 18 November 2013).

<sup>100</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*, 3-4.

as the present leader of the hardcore LTTEers.<sup>101</sup> The main objectives of the TEPA / TNC is to be the sole representative of the Tamils and to establish a separate state in Sri Lanka. Its focuses and activities include the revamping of the overseas LTTE network, control of all former LTTE Front Offices, LTTE assets, a majority of the former LTTE media, and to control a majority of the Tamil schools in Europe.<sup>102</sup>

5. Ex-combatant / Intelligence Group: This group emerged in early 2010 and consists of a number of ex-LTTE members who escaped Sri Lanka during the conflict period and criminal LTTE elements overseas. Vinayagam, a very senior LTTE intelligence wing leader who escaped from the conflict in 2009 is reported to be the virtual leader of this group. Most of the members of this organization maintain a low profile as they have been issued with international arrest warrants.<sup>103</sup> Their activities include control of LTTE assets, especially ships and aircraft, engaging in piracy, drug smuggling and procurement, and engaging in human smuggling.<sup>104</sup> A summary of above groups is presented in table 2.

---

<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 18.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., 23.

Table 2. Summary of Tamil Diaspora Groups

| Approach                                 | Group                       | Leader                  | Base / area of operation                          |
|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| “Political-diplomatic” and “non-violent” | TGTE                        | Viswanadan Rudrakumaran | Based in the U.S. / active in the U.S. and Europe |
|  | GTF                         | Fr. S.J. Emmanuel       | Based in Germany / active in Europe               |
|  | BTF                         | Suren Surendiran        | Based in the UK / active in Europe                |
| “Radical”                                | TEPA / TNC                  | Nediyawan               | Based in Norway / active in Europe                |
|  | Ex-combatant / Intelligence | Vinayagam               | Based in France / active in Europe                |

*Source:* Created by author.

#### The LTTE’s nexus with Tamil Diaspora Groups

The nexus of the present Tamil diaspora groups to the LTTE is quite understandable. The Prime Minister of the TGTE, Visuanadan Rudrakumaran was the legal advisor to the LTTE leader and there is technical evidence which has proven his nexus with the LTTE leader. Visuanadan Rudrakumaran is reported to have met the LTTE leader during 2001 / 2002 in Sri Lanka.<sup>105</sup> The deputy speaker of the TGTE, Puthirasigamani Sugunya is reported to be a trained LTTE cadre. She is a Switzerland based Tamil activist and had visited Sri Lanka in 2004 to take part in LTTE training.<sup>106</sup> Head of the GTF, Fr. S.J. Emmanuel too had maintained very close links with the LTTE

---

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 3, 11.

<sup>106</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Terrorist Cry Human Rights: Evidence: Many facets of Puthirasigamani Sugunya,” [http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20120309\\_03](http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20120309_03) (accessed 3 December 2013).

leader and even had visited LTTE hideouts in Sri Lanka to conduct lectures to LTTE cadres.<sup>107</sup>

#### Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK, Canada, and the U.S.A.

The Tamil diaspora’s “political-diplomatic” approach in each country under reference is presented below.

##### Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK

The UK has a 300,000 Tamil diaspora community.<sup>108</sup> The BTF serves as the main and influential Front Organization for the Tamil cause in the UK. It works closely with major British political parties to achieve its goals. Members of the BTF organize many events to present the Tamil case to the British parliamentarians. The BTF has its sub-organizational parties supporting each of the major political parties in the UK. Tamils for Labor Party (TLP) supports the Labor party; British Tamil Conservatives (BTC) support the Conservative Party; and Tamils for Liberal Democratic (BTLD) support the Liberal Democrats.<sup>109</sup> The lines of influence of such Tamil political parties are depicted in the figure 4.<sup>110</sup>

---

<sup>107</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat*—June 2012, 25-26.

<sup>108</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” 2-3.

<sup>109</sup>BTF, “Advocacy,” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/lobby/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>110</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat*—June 2012, 33.




Figure 4. Lobbying Support for the Eelam Cause in the UK

Source: Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat*—June 2012 (Colombo: Government Printers, 2012), 33.

### Political Significance

A WikiLeaks cable in 2010 revealed that former UK foreign secretary Mr. David Miliband's championing of aid and human rights during the Sri Lankan conflict was largely driven by domestic political calculations and intensely focused on the plight of the country's Tamil community in terms of the UK's electoral geography. It further said that the former foreign secretary spent 60 percent of his time on Sri Lanka, paying particular attention on Sri Lanka as the UK Tamil community played a vital role in the

UK elections.<sup>111</sup> This is a continuing trend and this clearly indicates the influence the Tamil community has on politics in the UK.

In February 2010, the Tamil diaspora in the UK held an election to see whether the diaspora community would endorse the creation of an independent Tamil state in the North of Sri Lanka. The results indicated that 99.33 percent of the Tamil diaspora in the UK was in favor of a separate state. The BTF has highlighted that the vote has underlined the Tamils' commitment to independence. The Tamil diaspora in the UK believed that independence was the only solution to the problem.<sup>112</sup>

In April 2013, around 5,000 British Tamil diaspora, identifying themselves as Eelam Tamils, staged a protest demanding a "Tamil Eelam state" in Sri Lanka. They asked the UN to act and conduct a referendum to determine the creation of Tamil Eelam in the North and East of Sri Lanka.<sup>113</sup> In June 2013, the second generation Tamil diaspora living in the UK called for a referendum to create a separate state in Sri Lanka for Tamil people. Their demand was also a UN monitored referendum focusing on recognizing the

---

<sup>111</sup>The Telegraph, "WikiLeaks: David Miliband championed aid to Sri Lanka to win votes of Tamils in UK," <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8175415/WikiLeaks-David-Miliband-championed-aid-to-Sri-Lanka-to-win-votes-of-Tamils-in-UK.html> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>112</sup>The Guardian, "British-based Tamils vote for Independent State in Sri Lanka," <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/01/british-tamil-state-sri-lanka> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>113</sup>TamilNet, "5,000 Tamils marching in London reject LLRC, demand Tamil Eelam," <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=36199> (accessed 3 December 2013).

sovereign nationhood, right to self-determination and recognizing the territorial integrity of a historical homeland of the Eelam Tamils in the North and East of Sri Lanka.<sup>114</sup>

### Diplomatic Reach

It is significant to note the ability of the UK Tamil diaspora to reach the highest levels of the UK Government. In July 2011, GTF facilitated a parliamentary reception in the UK to discuss issues related to pre and post war Sri Lanka. This was attended by 40 MPs and many other representatives from leading NGOs, embassies and high commissions. The event was hosted by Mr. Lee Scott Member of Parliament (MP) (conservative) and Mrs. Siobhain McDonagh MP (labor), Chair and Vice-Chair the of All Party Parliamentary Group for Tamils (APPG-T). Some of the significant attendees included Mr. Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, former UK Foreign Secretary Mr. David Miliband and former British Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Des Brown MP (labor). Topics discussed were included the conduct of the war by the Sri Lankan Government, an international investigation into alleged war crimes, and notably, building of an international coalition to mobilize international support for a political solution in Sri Lanka.<sup>115</sup> It is worth noting

---

<sup>114</sup>TamilNet, “Tamil youth in UK demand Referendum for Tamil Eelam,” <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=36433> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>115</sup>TamilNet, “British MPs support international investigations of Sri Lanka mass killings,” <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=34152> (accessed 3 December 2013).

that any political solution in Sri Lanka advocated by the GTF must ensure Tamil's right to self-determination and a permanent autonomy.<sup>116</sup>

In July 2013, BTF Members met with Mr. Alistair Burt of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office over the scheduled November visit of the UK Prime Minister, Mr. David Cameron, to Sri Lanka to attend the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).<sup>117</sup> This was followed by the BTF members meeting directly with the UK Prime Minister on 7 November 2013 to challenge his decision to attend the CHOGM to be held in Sri Lanka.<sup>118</sup> The BTF held a meeting with leader of the UK Labor Party, Mr. Ed Miliband MP on 1 November 2013 on a similar line.<sup>119</sup> Similarly, other Tamil groups are also maintaining close links with the respective political representations. A letter dated 16 May 2013 addressed to the Prime Minister, signed by a number of British

---

<sup>116</sup>Tamil Guardian, "Any political solution must ensure Tamil right to self-determination and irreversible autonomy—GTF," <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=4273> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>117</sup>BTF, "British Tamils reiterate call for UK Government to boycott CHOGM in Sri Lanka," <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2013/07/british-tamils-reiterate-call-for-uk-government-to-boycott-chogm-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>118</sup>BTF, "British Tamils press David Cameron on UK participation in CHOGM," <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2013/11/british-tamils-press-david-cameron-on-uk-participation-in-chogm/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>119</sup>BTF, "British Tamils Meet Labour Leader Ed Milliband to Discuss CHOGM and War Crimes in Sri Lanka," <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2013/11/british-tamils-meet-labour-leader-ed-milliband-to-discuss-chogm-and-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

MPs, voiced on behalf of the British Tamil community and advocated a very similar line.<sup>120</sup>

#### Tamil Diaspora Activities in Canada

Canada has the largest Tamil diaspora community totaling about 380,000.<sup>121</sup> Over the years, Canada has gained recognition as the most important international safe haven for the LTTE cadres and their propaganda, fundraising and procurement activities. After the military defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Canada has been the most popular destination for most of the former LTTE fighters and supporters. A former LTTE weapons smuggling ship arrived in Canada in October 2009 with some Tamil refugees and former terrorists and included at least one LTTE suicide cadre who was wanted by INTERPOL.<sup>122</sup> The second ship carrying another wave of Tamil refugees arrived in Canada in August 2010 and the Canadian Government believed that some of the migrants were members of the LTTE.<sup>123</sup>

The Tamil diaspora in Canada is highly concentrated in Toronto making its members a politically significant community. As per the 1991 census in Canada, the

---

<sup>120</sup>British Tamil Conservatives, “Letter to PM from APPGT,” <http://britishtamilconservatives.co.uk/2013/05/appgt-letter-to-prime-minister-david-cameron/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

<sup>121</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” 2-3.

<sup>122</sup>Global Brief, “The LTTE is Targeting Canada,” <http://globalbrief.ca/tomquiggin/2009/10/27/the-ltte-is-targeting-canada/> (accessed 7 December 2013).

<sup>123</sup>CBC News, “Tamil Migrants to be Investigated: Toews: Hundreds arriving in B.C. seek Refugee Protection,” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/tamil-migrants-to-be-investigated-toews-1.898421> (accessed 7 December 2013).

Tamil community has been identified as the fastest growing ethnic group in Metropolitan Toronto and Toronto itself has been identified as “the city with the largest number of Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the world.”<sup>124</sup> These Tamil diaspora communities in Canada represent a number of dispersed influential Tamil groups (at least 34 groups) focusing on the political, cultural, social, and economic spheres.<sup>125</sup>

### Political Significance

The Tamil diaspora community in the Toronto electorate which is represented by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs has 6,000 Tamil voters. The influence of this community can be gauged by the foreign minister including the Sri Lankan civil war in the Canadian foreign policy agenda.<sup>126</sup> In December 2009, the Canadian Tamil diaspora held an election to mandate an independent and sovereign Tamil Eelam state in Sri Lanka. This was recognized as the first independent nationwide referendum ever by a Canadian community across major Canadian cities. 99.82 percent of the Canadian Tamil diaspora that voted endorsed creating an independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup>Wikipedia, “Tamil Canadian,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil\\_Canadian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_Canadian) (accessed 7 December 2013).

<sup>125</sup>Tamil Canadian, “Organizations and Associations,” <http://www.tamilcanadian.com/page.php?cat=551&id=4295> (accessed 7 December 2013).

<sup>126</sup>R. Cheran, *Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka* (Berlin, Germany: Berghof Foundation for Conflict Management, 2004), <http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/DiasporaCirc.pdf> (accessed 8 December 2013).

<sup>127</sup>TamilNet, “99.8 percent say yes to Tamil Eelam in Canada Referendum,” <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=30845> (accessed 9 December 2013).

The federal election 2011 in Canada saw the first ever MP representing the Tamil diaspora being elected to the Canadian parliament. Ms. Rathika Sitsabaisen, a Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora activist, representing the New Democrat Party (NDP) won the Ontario riding of Scarborough, Rouge River. As she highlighted, this is very significant for the Tamil diaspora as she carries a special sense of responsibility as Canada's first Tamil MP. She further elaborated saying that "I have been a Tamil all my life and those negative stigmas on the community . . . we have the opportunity now to break through. We as a community cannot be thrown under that blanket statement. This is just another step in the development of the Canadian Tamil community."<sup>128</sup> In March 2012, the TYO in Canada declared their uncompromising support to the Eelam state in Sri Lanka at the Tamil Eelam Sovereignty Conference. The declaration reaffirmed the principles of the Vaddukkodai Resolution in 1976 and upheld the legacy of the Tamil Eelam freedom struggle. It further rejected the imposition of the "Sri Lankan" identity on the Eelam Tamils.<sup>129</sup>

### Diplomatic Reach

The political significance of the Tamil diaspora in Canada has largely given the Tamil access to a high level of Canadian Government officials. Many of the Tamil Canadian events were attended by dignitaries of the Canadian Government. In 2000, then

---

<sup>128</sup>CBC News, "Canada's first Tamil MP looks Forward to Challenge," <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/canada-s-first-tamil-mp-looks-forward-to-challenge-1.1061403> (accessed 8 December 2013).

<sup>129</sup>Canadian Tamil Youth Alliance, "Canadian Tamil Youth declare uncompromising support for freedom at Tamil Eelam Sovereignty Conference," <http://ctya.org/blog/canadian-tamil-youth-declare-uncompromising-support-for-freedom-at-tamil-eelam-sovereignty-conference/> (accessed 9 December 2013).

Finance Minister Mr. Paul Martin and International Cooperation Minister Mrs. Maria Minna attended a LTTE fundraising event organized by an organization named Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT). Despite warnings by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) on the true nature of the event, both Ministers lent their weight and attended the event.<sup>130</sup>

In September 2011, Ms. Rathika Sitasabaieasan MP (NDP) co-hosted the parliamentary screening of a documentary “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” by Channel 4 news UK, which depicted alleged war crimes during the Sri Lankan conflict. The event was attended by Mr. Patrick Brownie MP (conservative), Mr. John McKay MP (liberal) and Mrs. Elaine Pearson, Deputy Director for Asia, from Human Rights Watch.<sup>131</sup> In April 2012, Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), a member organization of the GTF, managed to organize a press conference in the Canadian Parliamentary Gallery to highlight the issues related to Sri Lanka. This was followed by the screening of a documentary, “War Crimes Unpunished” by Channel 4 news UK, the second episode of “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields”. The key note speakers at the press conference were Mr. John McCallum MP (liberal) and Ms. Rathika Sitasabaieasan MP (NDP). All speakers focused on the much needed support and international attention towards the situation in Sri Lanka.<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup>Global Brief, “The LTTE is Targeting Canada.”

<sup>131</sup>Tamil Guardian, “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields screened to Canadian MPs,” <http://tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3568> (accessed 8 December 2013).

<sup>132</sup>Canadian Tamil Congress, “CTC Press Conference and Channel 4’s ‘War Crimes Unpunished’ screened at the Canadian Parliament,” <http://canadiantamilcongress.net/article.php?lan=eng&id=54> (accessed 8 December 2013).

In January 2013, CTC organized a gala and the guests who attended included political leaders, MPs and many community leaders. Mr. Chris Alexander MP and Parliamentary Secretary for National Defense who attended the gala brought greetings from Prime Minister Mr. Stephen Harper. Canada's first-ever Tamil origin MP Ms. Rathilka Sitasabaieasan (NDP) was among many other MPs who attended the event. This event coincided with CTC honoring Toronto Police chief Bill Blair and donating \$ 47,000 to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.<sup>133</sup>

In October 2013, Canadian Prime Minister Mr. Stephen Harper decided to boycott the CHOGM to be held in Sri Lanka. However, critics said that boycotting the Commonwealth summit was simply to court the Tamil voters in Canada and for wooing the Tamil electorate in advance of the next federal election to be held in Canada. The fact that the Tamil community concentration in the Greater Toronto Area held six seats in the House of Commons was explained as the motive for the move.<sup>134</sup> Interestingly, the CTC welcomed the Premier's decision to boycott the summit. The CTC thanked the Prime Minister for going further ahead and asking the Minister of Foreign Affairs to review Canada's financial contributions to CHOGM.<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>133</sup>News East West, "Tamil Canadians Honor Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair, donate \$47,000 to CAMH," <http://newseastwest.com/tamil-canadians-honour-toronto-police-chief-bill-blair-with-leaders-for-change-award/> (accessed 8 December 2013).

<sup>134</sup>The Star, "Harper panders to Tamils by boycotting Commonwealth Summit," [http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/11/13/harper\\_panders\\_to\\_tamils\\_by\\_boycotting\\_commonwealth\\_summit.html](http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/11/13/harper_panders_to_tamils_by_boycotting_commonwealth_summit.html) (accessed 12 December 2013).

<sup>135</sup>Canadian Tamil Congress, "Tamil Canadians Welcome Prime Minister Harper's Principled Decision to Boycott CHOGM," <http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=108> (accessed 12 December 2013).

## Tamil Diaspora Activities in the U.S.A.

The U.S. Tamil diaspora community is constituted by about 35,000.<sup>136</sup> The U.S.A is important to the Tamil diaspora as the functional office of the TGTE is located at 875, Avenues of Americas, Suite 1001, New York, 10001, U.S.A.<sup>137</sup> Further, the Prime Minister of the TGTE, Viswanadan Rudrakumaran, a Tamil origin U.S. citizen is also based in the U.S.A.<sup>138</sup> The TGTE had its inaugural parliamentary session of the first parliament at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in May 2009<sup>139</sup> and they had their inaugural parliamentary session of the second parliament session in New Jersey in December 2013.<sup>140</sup> Most of the Tamil diaspora activities in the U.S.A. are focused on canvassing political and diplomatic support to the Eelam cause.

---

<sup>136</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” 2-3.

<sup>137</sup>TGTE, “About us,” <http://www.tgte-us.org/about.html> (accessed 20 December 2013).

<sup>138</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat—June 2012*, 2.

<sup>139</sup>Transcurrents, “TNGTE: The Inaugural sessions of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam,” [http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/tngte\\_the\\_ inaugural\\_sessions\\_o.html](http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/tngte_the_ inaugural_sessions_o.html) (accessed 20 December 2013).

<sup>140</sup>EIN Presswire, “TGTE Second Parliament Inaugurated, Elects Prime Minister and Speaker,” <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/180314436/transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-s-tgte-2nd-parliament-inaugurated-elects-prime-minister-speaker> (accessed 20 December 2013).

## Political Significance

Tamils for Obama, a U.S. Tamil diaspora front, in June 2011 launched a signature campaign for a referendum based on self-determination for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>141</sup> A letter published by the Tamils for Obama addressed to President Obama has requested the U.S. to back a Southern Sudan type referendum in Sri Lanka to have an independent homeland for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>142</sup>

In September 2012, TGTE senators gathered in New York to work out strategies to mobilize world opinion for establishing Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. They were tasked to draw a roadmap to establish an independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam considering the current global, economic and geopolitical realities.<sup>143</sup> In May 2013, the TGTE declared the Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter in Lancaster, Pennsylvania and the event was attended by Dr. Ramsay Clark, former U.S. Attorney General, Honorable Daniel Mayan M.P. from South Sudan, and Dr. Nuran Nabi, key activist behind the Bangladesh Liberation Movement “Mukti Bahini.” The charter emphasized that the creation of an independent and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka remains the

---

<sup>141</sup>PR Web, “Tamils for Obama Launches a Signature Campaign for a Referendum in Sri Lanka to Gain Self-Determination for Tamils,” <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/6/prweb8503874.htm> (accessed 20 December 2013).

<sup>141</sup>Tamils for Obama, “Eelam Referendum,” <http://www.tamilsforobama.com/Referendum2011/english.asp> (accessed 20 December 2013).

<sup>141</sup>Tamil Canadian, “TGTE Senate to Work on Roadmap to Tamil Eelam,” <http://www.tamilcanadian.com/article/6270> (accessed 20 December 2013).

<sup>142</sup>Tamils for Obama, “Eelam Referendum.”

<sup>143</sup>Tamil Canadian, “TGTE Senate to Work on Roadmap to Tamil Eelam.”

only viable option to lead a life with security, dignity and equality for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>144</sup>

Prof. Francis Boyle, an expert in international law at the University of Illinois College of Law, speaking at the event stated that “under international laws and covenants the Tamils of Eelam have not only the right to self-determination but that right also includes the right to establish a free and sovereign state of Tamil Eelam consisting of their historical homelands . . . and here I wish to quote from an international treaty to which the Government of Sri Lanka is a party, thus implicitly recognizing that the Tamils of Sri Lanka have a right of self-determination and this is from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Government of Sri Lanka is a party.”<sup>145</sup>

In July 2013, Tamils for Obama sent letters to each of the members of both houses of Congress urging them to pass a resolution in both houses of Congress to push for a referendum on the independence of Tamils in Sri Lanka supporting any effort by President Obama to push forward such a referendum.<sup>146</sup>

---

<sup>144</sup>EIN Presswire, “Special Relationship with India will be maintained by Independent Tamil State in the Island of Sri Lanka: TGTE,” <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/154008901/special-relationship-with-india-will-be-maintained-by-independent-tamil-state-in-the-island-of-sri-lanka-tgte> (accessed 22 December 2013).

<sup>145</sup>Colombo Telegraph, “Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter: A Giant Step in the Right Direction–Prof. Francis Boyle,” <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamil-eelam-freedom-charter-a-giant-step-in-the-right-direction-prof-francis-boyle/> (accessed 22 December 2013).

<sup>146</sup>Tamils for Obama, “US Congress Urged to Support Independence Referendum in Northeast of Sri Lanka,” <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/8/prweb10982515.htm> (accessed 22 December 2013).

## Diplomatic Reach

In March 2011, a Tamil diaspora delegation met U.S. Assistant Secretary Robert O. Blake at the U.S. State Department in Washington focusing on the resolution of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Key members who attended the meeting were GTF president, Fr. S.J. Emmanuel and president of the United States Tamil Political Action Council (USTPAC), Dr. Elias Jeyarajah and senior member of the BTF, Mr. Suren Surendiran.<sup>147</sup>

In February 2012, members from Tamils for Obama were invited by Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Robert O. Blake to meet with him to discuss matters concerning Tamils in Sri Lanka. They handed over copies of a petition for a “Referendum in Sri Lanka to gain self-determination for Tamils.” and one copy was intended for Secretary Clinton.<sup>148</sup>

In August 2012, the Prime Minister of the TGTE announced Mr. Ramsey Clark, the former Attorney General of the U.S. as one of their senators in the Tamil Eelam government in exile. His selection was based on his outspoken attitude towards the Tamil community.<sup>149</sup> He was also a member of the team drawing the Eelam Roadmap to

---

<sup>147</sup>GTF, “Global Tamil Forum meets with US Assistant Secretary Blake,” <http://globaltamilforum.org/userfiles/file/Press%20Statement%20-%20Robert%20O%20Blake%20March%202011%20Meeting%20-%20English%20Version%281%29.pdf> (accessed 23 December 2013).

<sup>148</sup>PR Web, “Tamil for Obama Meets with Assistant Secretary Blake, Asks Blake, Clinton to Push Self-Government Referendum in Northeastern Sri Lanka,” <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9326814.htm> (accessed 23 December 2013).

<sup>149</sup>Colombo Telegraph, “A Former US AG Joins Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam as a Senator, a Sinhalese also Joins the Senate,” <https://www.colombo>

establish a Tamil Eelam State in Sri Lanka. This selection might provide a diplomatic mileage to the TGTE as the TGTE could use Mr. Ramsey Clark's agreement to become a senator to gain legitimacy for the TGTE.

During the U.S. elections 2012, Tamils for Obama campaigned for President Obama. They collected money for his campaign and claimed that they contributed towards him to becoming president in 2008.<sup>150</sup> With the conclusion of the election, they wrote to President Obama that they raised funds for his campaign and polled opinion among Tamil Americans towards Obama. Further, they have requested President Obama and the next Secretary of State to take an active part in creating Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.<sup>151</sup>

#### Tamil Diaspora Propaganda Networks

The Tamil diaspora use the media as an extensive tool to continue to propagate its ideology and to message to the international community. To this end, it maintains a number of TV broadcasting stations, radio networks, websites, and printed media. The Tamil diaspora elements use certain international media institutions and independent journalists to canvas its cause in the eyes of the international community.<sup>152</sup> The main

---

telegraph.com/index.php/a-former-us-ag-joins-transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-as-a-senator-a-sinhalese-also-joins-the-senate (accessed 23 December 2013).

<sup>150</sup>Tamils for Obama, "Contribution," <http://www.tamilsforobama.com/Contribution.html> (accessed 23 December 2013).

<sup>151</sup>Tamil for Obama, "Re: Your victory, and our part in it," [http://www.tamilsforobama.com/letters/congratulations\\_mr\\_President\\_2012.html](http://www.tamilsforobama.com/letters/congratulations_mr_President_2012.html) (accessed 23 December 2013).

<sup>152</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat—June 2012*, 5.

aim of the pro-LTTE propaganda machinery is to increase international political support for its cause and has always been on the following lines:<sup>153</sup>

1. Tamils are the innocent victims of a government dominated by Sinhalese.
2. Sri Lankan Tamils, constituting 12.5 percent of the population, are subjected to constant discrimination and military oppression.
3. The Tamils can never peacefully coexist with the Sinhalese in a single state.

The newest message of the Tamil diaspora is identified as the use of “genocide” in place of “separatism” after the military defeat of the LTTE. Alleged violations of humanitarian law and claims of war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan Forces during the conflict have provided a new agenda to the Tamil diaspora to gain a political mileage. The Tamil diaspora groups are using this line very effectively to discredit the Sri Lankan victory as an act of “genocide” and stating the reconciliation is not possible even after the military defeat of the LTTE. Thus, they justify the establishment of a separate state for Tamil people as the final solution.<sup>154</sup>

This genocide message is well articulated by organizations like Tamils Against Genocide (TAG). TAG is a global Tamil organization that emerged in the U.S.A. in 2008 for advocacy, research, and litigation against Tamil genocide and human rights violations against Tamils. TAG is working with like-minded people to support the cause of justice

---

<sup>153</sup>Mahinda Balasuriya, “LTTE’s Propaganda Infrastructure and LTTE’s exploitation of new Media Technology,” <http://www.worldscientists.ru/defence-and-security/5-ltte-s-propaganda-infrastructure-and-ltte-s-exploitation-of-new-media-technology.html> (accessed 5 January 2014).

<sup>154</sup>Independent European Daily Express, “Genocide Replaces Separatism in Tamil Diaspora Vocabulary,” [http://www.iede.co.uk/news/2013\\_3309/genocide-replaces-separatism-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary](http://www.iede.co.uk/news/2013_3309/genocide-replaces-separatism-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary) (accessed 5 January 2014).

for the Tamil speaking people in Sri Lanka and maintains liaison with governments around the globe as well as domestic and international non-governmental, legal, media and activist organizations to promote same. They use public speeches, publications, social media and other means to voice against rights violations against the Tamil speaking people in Sri Lanka.<sup>155</sup>

Another informational approach targeting Sri Lanka is “Boycott Sri Lanka” which is focused on bringing collective pressure on the GoSL to end the alleged relentless war crimes, violence against Tamil speaking people in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka army atrocities in the so-called Tamil Eelam and the Tamil genocide in Sri Lanka. This campaign tries to achieve its objectives through the boycott of Sri Lankan tourism and products including branded garments, textiles, tea and other products made in Sri Lanka. The idea of the campaign is that as it worked in South Africa, to adopt a similar line to make it work in Sri Lanka.<sup>156</sup> The Tamil diaspora fronts like the BTF is also taking the same line and promoting the Boycott Sri Lanka campaign.<sup>157</sup>

The boycott Sri Lanka campaign is not limited to tourism or products. The Tamil Youth Organization (TYO) is conducting a “Boycott Sri Lankan Cricket” campaign in parallel to the “Boycott Sri Lanka.” The main objective of the campaign is to send a clear message to the GoSL that Sri Lankan sports are not accepted in international fora as they

---

<sup>155</sup>Tamils Against Genocide, “About TAG,” <http://www.tamilsagainstgenocide.org/AboutTAG.aspx> (accessed 7 January 2014).

<sup>156</sup>Boycott Sri Lanka, “About us,” <http://www.boycottsrilanka.com/about-us> (accessed 7 January 2014).

<sup>157</sup>BTF, “Boycott Sri Lanka,” <http://tamilforum.co.uk/campaigns/appeals/boycott-sri-lanka/> (accessed 7 January 2014).

have labeled the GoSL as war criminals.<sup>158</sup> The basis for this campaign is linkage of sport and politics, the sporting isolation of South Africa in 1970 and 1980 during the apartheid regime, and England's distancing from Zimbabwe cricket in 2008 on the basis that Robert Mugabe's government had committed many human rights abuses.<sup>159</sup>

To operationalize the above, the Tamil diaspora extensively uses its media network. The architecture of the LTTE / pro-LTTE media network is illustrated in figure 5.<sup>160</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup>Tamil Guardian, “Why a sports boycott is essential for justice,” <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3270> (accessed 7 January 2014).

<sup>159</sup>Tamil Youth Organization UK, “Boycott Sri Lankan Cricket,” <http://www.tyouk.org/boycott/cricket.html> (accessed 7 January 2014).

<sup>160</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*, 51.




Figure 5. The LTTE / pro-LTTE Media Network

Source: Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012* (Colombo: Government Printers, 2012), 51.

### Case Studies of East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan Separatism

#### East Timor

The emergence of the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor commonly known as Fretilin as a candidate to the East Timor Constituent Assembly election in 1976 was seen as the developing of socialism especially by neighboring Indonesia. This fear was further consolidated when Fretilin and Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) emerged as the largest parties to coalitions in local elections in 1975. However, this coalition ended in 1975 when UDT carried out a coup. Portuguese Governor fled during the coup

and Fretilin's requests for him to return and recommence the decolonization process in East Timor was futile.<sup>161</sup>

Indonesia invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975 and on 17 July 1975 East Timor was annexed to Indonesia as its 27th province. Indonesia continuously and heavily suppressed Timorese independence movements. It is reported that nearly 100,000 to 200,000 out of 800,000 East Timorese population died during these suppressions. The Indonesian military was allegedly involved in many human rights violations and atrocities against the Timorese population. Such atrocities were the key messages of Timorese independence movements to the rest of the world but it received less response. However, the 1991 Dili massacre prompted wide international attention into Indonesian atrocities in East Timor. In 1999, heavy international pressure mounted on the Indonesian government to hold a referendum to decide the future of East Timor. The UN organized 1999 referendum saw 78.5 percent of East Timorese voting in favor of the independence of East Timor and rejecting the offer of being an autonomous province within Indonesia. The UN created the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under Security Council Resolution 1264 to stabilize East Timor and East Timor was placed under the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) for transition. On 20 May 2002, East Timor formally declared independence and became a member of the UN on 27 September 2002.<sup>162</sup>

---

<sup>161</sup>East Timor Government, "History of East Timor," <http://www.easttimorgovernment.com/history.htm> (accessed 8 May 2014).

<sup>162</sup>Ibid.

## Kosovo

Since the 1980s, ethnic tensions were reported in Kosovo. Serbia adopted an aggressive policy towards Kosovo's special autonomous status within Serbia and Serbia claimed it is an Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. Serbs started oppressing Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo and in response to such oppression a non-violent separatist movement emerged in Kosovo with the goal of achieving independence for Kosovo. The Bosnian war ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, however, hope for peace for Kosovar Albanians was still limited as Serbs increased their atrocities towards the Kosovar Albanian population. As a resort, in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started armed opposition to Serbian forces.<sup>163</sup>

It is reported that nearly a million Albanians were displaced or forced to leave Kosovo during the conflict. Nearly 11,000 died, some 3,000 people are still missing. The Racak massacre in 1999 was significant as it brought worldwide attention to the problem and to the Serbs' atrocities. This prompted the Rambouillet Accords which called for the deployment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to restore Kosovo's autonomy. In June 1999, the UN Security Council resolution 1244 was adopted and Kosovo was placed under the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in support of the transition. Negotiations were continued to decide the final status of Kosovo. The first election of the Kosovo Assembly was held in 2001 supervised by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Subsequently, in 2004, the Kosovo-wide elections were held and in 2007 parliamentary elections were held. The

---

<sup>163</sup>Wikipedia, "Kosovo War," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War) (accessed 9 May 2014).

Democratic Party of Kosovo claimed the victory and joined with the Democratic League to form a coalition, and signaled for independence. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence despite differences between members of the UN Security Council. However, as of February 2014, 107 UN member states have recognized Kosovo as an independent country.<sup>164</sup>

### South Sudan

On the verge of independence from Egypt in 1956, South Sudan indicated its concerns to the Sudanese government on neglecting promises of allowing autonomy to the south and the forcible enforcement of Islamic and Arabic identity on them. These messages were poorly answered by the Sudanese government resulting in mutiny in 1955 by army officers in the south. The Anya Nya guerrilla movement emerged as a South Sudan separatist movement and fought with the Sudanese government in the first Sudanese civil war. However, South Sudan was able to gain some autonomy in 1972 when they signed the Addis Ababa peace agreement. In 1983, the Sudanese government cancelled the 1972 peace agreement blocking South Sudan's autonomy. Another rebellion emerged led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).<sup>165</sup>

The two decade long war in Sudan greatly affected the country's progress. It is estimated that approximately 2.5 million people died and nearly four million people were displaced due to the conflict. Over and above, a high degree of violations of rights,

---

<sup>164</sup>Ibid.

<sup>165</sup>BBC, “South Sudan Profile,” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082> (accessed 9 May 2014).

indiscriminate burning of villages, burning villagers alive, raping of hundreds of women and girls, alleged torture of civilians, and recruitment of child soldiers were reported during this period.<sup>166</sup> In 2002, the U.S. government's Sudan Peace Accord accused the Sudanese government of genocide in the south specifically during the second Sudanese Civil War.<sup>167</sup>

In 2005, South Sudan gained regional autonomy and representation in a national power sharing government under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This agreement subsequently lead to the South Sudan referendum. In January 2011, South Sudan hold a referendum to decide whether to become an independent state or remain annexed to Sudan. 98.83 percent voted to become an independent state and on 9 July 2011 South Sudan declared independence. South Sudan became the 193rd member state in the UN and it signed the Geneva Conventions.<sup>168</sup>

---

<sup>166</sup>Wikipedia, “South Sudan,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Sudan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan) (accessed 10 May 2014).

<sup>167</sup> Wikipedia, “Second Sudanese Civil War,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Sudanese\\_Civil\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War) (accessed 10 May 2014).

<sup>168</sup>Wikipedia, “South Sudan.”

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis was focused on examining how an external actor, specifically a diaspora, could contribute to promoting separatism when the internal actor, the armed component of the separatist insurgency, was thoroughly defeated militarily in a country. The role of the diaspora during an armed struggle and a political struggle may be varied. The researcher tried to identify the role of the diaspora in a continuing separatist movement through “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches when the armed separatism approach came to an end.

In general, during an armed struggle, the diaspora supports the separatist movement by providing moral support to the armed wing, moral support to the separatist cause, raising funds, providing recruits and fighters, procuring arms, ammunition and supplies, shaping the international attitude towards the separatist cause, legitimizing the separatist cause and activities of the armed wing, issuing extensive propaganda to justify its cause, disseminating mis-information campaigns to discredit the host government, and publicizing acts of violence and suppression by the host nation government. In other words, the diaspora is an auxiliary to the main effort which is the struggle inside the country.

During a political struggle in the absence of that armed group, the diaspora may not leverage any violent activities. Its support may include continuing to raise funds, providing moral support to the separatist cause but not to any violent activities, shaping the international attitude towards the separatist cause, legitimizing the separatist cause, mobilizing political support in the country of residence, networking with key decision

makers and celebrities, seeking recognition for its government-in-exile organization, continuing extensive propaganda to justify its cause, continuing mis-information campaigns to discredit the host government, and messaging acts of discrimination and suppression by the host government. The diaspora, in some cases, may become the main effort in the struggle for separatism.

There is no one single model of this non-violent approach but the generic pathway may include the combined use of “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches. This researcher used approaches adopted in East Timor (2002), Kosovo (2008), and South Sudan (2011) to create a generic model of “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches to seek a separatist endstate.

In all these three cases separatist movements achieved their endstate ultimately through referendums. There were a number of steps towards these referendums and each of these steps often overlapped each other. Such steps could be categorized as follows:

1. “Political-diplomatic” approach to establish international support, by gaining political and media influence in the countries of residence.
2. “Informational” approach to message and justify respectively the suppression by the host government and the cause.
3. Capitalizing on “trigger events” and maximizing through the use of both the above approaches to invite third-party intervention.
4. Mounting international pressure on the host government for a “referendum” as a resort.

In East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan they employed a “political-diplomatic” approach to engage state actors, decision makers, and eminent persons. The same

approach was also used to engage external pressure groups, and other non-state actors to include IGOs and NGOs. Ultimate UN involvement in all these cases was the outcome of such engagement. In all the cases, the separatist movements managed to convince the international community the genuineness of their grievances and inability or unwillingness of the host governments to sufficiently address their grievances.

In all the cases, the “informational” approach was concurrently used to message the genuineness of the causes, to highlighting the failure of the other options, oppression and unacceptable level of violence by the host governments, repression, imprisonments of leaders and members of separatist groups, inability of the host governments to address the grievances, lack of desire of those governments to change the policies to accommodate the grievances of separatist movements. The “informational” approach was further synchronized with the media efforts, specifically international media, to “internationalize” the issue. This approach was largely able to paint a negative international picture of those host governments and their actions.

Trigger events and casualties from violence in all the cases were used to draw wider international attention. Violent activities of the Fretelin in East Timor, the KLA in Kosovo, and the SPLA in South Sudan often provoked the host governments to take indiscriminate actions. Respectively, the 1991 Dili massacre in East Timor and the 1999 Racak massacre in Kosovo by the host governments drew wide international attention to the problem and ultimately triggered the third-party intervention. In all the above cases, faced with huge international pressure, all the host governments chose to allow a referendum as a result of the pressure.

Outcomes in East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan proved the effectiveness of the “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches. The researcher used this model to compare and contrast the Tamil diaspora approach towards actualizing a separate state in Sri Lanka. Further, the researcher used the four steps referred into this chapter to analyze the Tamil diaspora’s approach as well.

Further, the researcher focused the Tamil diaspora activities in the UK, Canada, and the U.S. as they are the main actors due to the degree of Tamil diaspora activities in those countries, the influence of those countries on international affairs as leading English-speaking governments, and the influence of those countries on Sri Lanka in particular. There was no pre-defined evaluation criteria to measure the outcome of the influence of the Tamil diaspora in those countries. As such, this researcher measured the ability of the Tamil diaspora to leverage domestic politics, engage with state actors, decision makers, eminent persons, and subsequent actions by those parties to pressure or influence the Sri Lankan government.

Separatist movements face three major obstacles in gaining international support. First, many countries face separatist movements themselves and do not wish to encourage or strengthen those movements. Many Western countries including France, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, and Denmark, to only name a few, face one or more separatist movements within their own borders. Second, violence, even numbering in hundreds of deaths annually, may not grab any significant media attention which usually precedes significant political concern of national politicians. Third, powerful states, especially permanent members of the UN Security Council, may block or nullify international pressure especially in the UN. According to some observers, Serbia allowed

the referendum in Kosovo ultimately because Russia ended its protective support. Such protection may offset pressure from other states or groups.

Diasporas composed of separatist populations have been successful as auxiliaries in obtaining internationally-demanded referenda. However, the “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches now attempted by the Tamil diaspora is a different pathway and may or may not be successful. If it does, it must successfully gain increasing international pressure on the Sri Lanka government and overcome the three major obstacles noted above.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

The war on terror after the 9/11 greatly discouraged any entity supporting terrorist movements. This approach affected and restricted diaspora's support to such movements. Such a context and the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 proved to the Tamil diaspora that continuing a "violent" approach has very little lifespan in the present environment. Chapter 4 will analyze the post conflict Tamil diaspora's ideological alignment with the LTTE's concept, and will analyze the Tamil diaspora's "non-violent" approach and use of "political-diplomatic" and "informational" approaches to promote, lobby, and canvas the Eelam cause after the defeat of the LTTE. This chapter will further compare and contrast such approaches with the generic model created based on case studies in East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan and try to establish the effectiveness of the Tamil diaspora's approach. This provides the answer to the secondary questions, what approaches are used by the Tamil diaspora and how do they use such approaches to achieve separatism in Sri Lanka?, and do these endeavors pose a significant threat to the sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka? This will ultimately answer the primary research question.

#### Analysis of ideological alignment of the LTTE and the Tamil Diaspora

In the absence of the LTTE, the Tamil diaspora continues along similar lines adopted by the LTTE to gain its demands. Analysis of the demands, aims and objectives of the Tamil diaspora groups clearly indicates their alignment with the LTTE's original objectives. Those are reflections of the LTTE's Vaddukoddai Resolution principles; the

Tamil nationality is a separate ethnic entity; Tamil in Sri Lanka have the right to self-determination; and the right for a Tamil Homeland in Sri Lanka.

It is clear that post-conflict Tamil diaspora groups have no deviation from the initial objective of the LTTE to create a separate state. Both the TGTE and GTF discussed creating a Tamil homeland and self-determination of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The TGTE, the Eelam government in exile goes a step further to establish direct links with foreign governments and other INGOs / IGOs and articulating positions for negotiations with the GoSL. The TGTE's role can be analyzed as the "official" or "elected" voice of Eelam Tamil representation in the international arena. The GTF's role can be analyzed as a force multiplier in mobilizing the Tamil diaspora towards the Eelam cause and mobilizing "political-diplomatic" support towards the very cause.

The only shift of the Tamil diaspora groups to achieve Eelam can then be identified as political, diplomatic and legal mobilization and information warfare instead of military means. For the TGTE, requisites of a state are blurred as they do not hold a permanent local Tamil population and they do not control a defined territory in Sri Lanka. However, the TGTE is an organized body elected through a democratic process and are foreseeing to engage with other foreign governments to gain some recognition. Still, the TGTE needs to work in partnership with the Tamil leadership in Sri Lanka (TNA is the candidate) to reach the local Tamil population to actualize its strategic goals.

#### Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora contribution during the LTTE's Lifecycle

The Tamil diaspora contribution varies at each of these stages and such activities are presented.

### Pre-insurgency stage

The period between 1948 and early 1983 can be defined as the pre-insurgency stage. This period showed the beginnings of Tamil national sentiment followed by many activities including the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, 1972 name change from “Ceylon” to “Sri Lanka” and the 1981 burning of the Jaffna Public Library.<sup>169</sup> Early Tamil migration was two-fold. Some elite Tamils migrated to foreign countries for higher education to secure better positions in civil administration and some migrated on personal grounds to secure a comfortable life abroad. Both migrations were lately influenced by a feeling of “Tamil marginalization” with actions such as the Sinhala Only Act. The LTTE’s influence on these diaspora communities was very marginal as the LTTE’s reach to such communities was not truly established or organized.

### Incipient conflict stage

The period between mid-1983 and 1993 can be considered as the incipient conflict stage. The LTTE’s power projection began with the 1983 July ambush in Jaffna which killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers. Anti-Tamil ethnic riots followed by this incident created waves of Tamil migration to other countries. It should also be noted that rival Tamils migrated not because of ethnic violence, but because of LTTE hostility towards them. Over and above these economic, personal, and educational migrations continued. Cultural identity pushed the Tamils in exile to group together irrespective of the cause of migration. These diaspora communities also shared social responsibility to assist local

---

<sup>169</sup>BBC, “Sri Lanka Profile: A Chronology of Key Events,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12004081> (accessed 20 January 2014).

Tamils. Such a situation was cleverly exploited by the LTTE during this period bringing the Tamil diaspora as an active member in the conflict.

The main focuses of Tamil diaspora during incipient stage were the opening of offices to organize and coordinate the activities of the diaspora, the collection of funds for the LTTE movement, setting up propaganda cells, and explore avenues for procurement of arms and ammunition. The first front office was opened in London in 1984<sup>170</sup> and movements such as the World Tamil Movement (WTM)<sup>171</sup> and the Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC) were established. The LTTE established its procurement network in 1987 in Malaysia in the guise of a shipping company and later moved to Thailand. During this stage the LTTE's procurement arm, "KP Department," expanded to a greater extend and linked with illegal weapons dealers worldwide to support the LTTE's war effort.<sup>172</sup> From 1990 to 1993, at least four LTTE arms ships were either detected or apprehended by the authorities. Further to money extortion from the Tamil community, the Tamil diaspora networks engaged in other illegal fund generation operations such as drug smuggling and human trafficking.<sup>173</sup> In summary, the main focuses of the diaspora networks during this stage were organizing the Tamil diaspora, fundraising, and procurement.

---

<sup>170</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat—June 2012* (Colombo: Government Printers, 2012), 2.

<sup>171</sup>Wikipedia, "World Tamil Movement," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_Tamil\\_Movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Tamil_Movement) (accessed 14 March 2014).

<sup>172</sup>Wikipedia, "Selvarasa Pathmanathan," [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selvarasa\\_Pathmanathan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selvarasa_Pathmanathan) (accessed 14 March 2014).

<sup>173</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 28.

### Open insurgency stage

The period between 1994 and 2005 saw a huge organizational and operational growth in the LTTE. The magnitude of the attacks were larger and across the North and East of Sri Lanka. Parallel to the military actions, the Tamil diaspora political emergence was significant. The main focuses of the Tamil diaspora during this stage were gaining political and diplomatic support, justifying its cause, extending propaganda networks, and continuing fund raising and procurement.

#### Political contribution

As of 1995, it was estimated that nearly 500,000 Tamil diaspora were deployed abroad with heavy concentration in Canada and the UK.<sup>174</sup> The LTTE opened up many front offices in at least 54 locations in 32 countries. These fronts continued to lobby foreign governments, policy and decision makers, eminent personnel, IGOs and INGOs, media networks, etc. and justified its cause on behalf of the LTTE.<sup>175</sup> As the community expanded, the Tamil diaspora's involvement in electoral politics too was observed during this stage. Further, the LTTE garnered the support of prominent and influential Tamil expatriates to link the LTTE and international community. Notably, Anton Balasingham, Tamil expatriate and a British citizen born in Sri Lanka played the role of the LTTE's chief political strategist and chief negotiator.<sup>176</sup>

---

<sup>174</sup>ICG, *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*, 3.

<sup>175</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 26.

<sup>176</sup>Wikipedia, “Anton Balasingham,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton\\_Balasingham](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton_Balasingham) (accessed 15 March 2014).

### Military contribution

The sophistication of the LTTE was evident during this period. They developed a land force and a naval force which was a near competitor to the GoSL forces. The LTTE was one of very few terrorist organizations to possess an air wing as well.<sup>177</sup> The diaspora role in the LTTE's military sophistication was significant. Firstly, procurement of arms, ammunition, other warlike materials, and logistics was largely based on funds raised abroad. Secondly, the LTTE international shipping network supported the transshipment of items procured through international sea lines of communication. At least six of the LTTE's arms carrying ships were destroyed by either Sri Lanka or the Indian Navy during this period.<sup>178</sup>

### External assistance

The Tamil diaspora's transnational operations opened new avenues for the LTTE to wage war against the GoSL. Pro-LTTE media networks played a major role in "messaging" and "internationalizing" the conflict to gain more attention to the problem and to propagate and canvas for the Eelam cause. The diaspora's political lines then sought the indirect political and diplomatic support towards its cause from policy and decision makers in foreign countries and other international bodies. A number of television and radio stations, websites, and printing presses were opened in Western countries. These networks further linked with several national and international media

---

<sup>177</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 5-6.

<sup>178</sup>Ibid., 24-25.

networks.<sup>179</sup> Politically sympathetic pressure groups and media networks were extensively used by diaspora groups as platforms to voice their cause. Target audiences were not only the diaspora itself but also political leaders, decision makers, and rights groups.<sup>180</sup>

### Resolution stage

The period between 2006 and 2009 can be considered as the resolution stage. The 2002 CFA failed in 2006 as the LTTE leadership did not display a genuine desire for peace. Hostilities resumed in July 2006 and the LTTE military outfit was defeated by the GoSL forces in May 2009.<sup>181</sup> The Tamil diaspora's main focuses during this stage were an extended information campaign and the canvassing for international support for third-party intervention to save the LTTE. They projected the final stage of war as a massacre and genocide of the innocent Tamil population in the name of defeating the LTTE, and desperately called for an international intervention. For the Tamil diaspora, the final stage of the battle was the trigger event. All the pro-LTTE fronts were working continuously to convince the international community and to get them to intervene at least for a ceasefire to create a breathing space for the LTTE. The pro-LTTE informational approach was used to highlight the "extreme suffering" of the Tamil community caught in between the

---

<sup>179</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>180</sup>Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 77: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organization and Operations - A Preliminary Analysis," <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm77-eng.asp> (accessed 16 March 2014).

<sup>181</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis*, 1, 36-37.

war, the alleged humanitarian crisis inside the war zone, the alleged Tamil genocide by the GoSL forces, and justify the right of the LTTE to defend the Tamil people.

#### Analysis of Tamil Diaspora Activities in the UK, Canada, and the U.S.A.

Each Tamil diaspora group uses different tools to promote the Eelam cause and has their chosen ground. The Tamil diaspora in many of the countries in reference constitute a considerable labor force and more significantly a considerable voter bloc for the local political parties and politicians.<sup>182</sup> Most of the local political parties and politicians representing the Tamil diaspora predominant areas in such countries are heavily dependent on these vote blocs for their political survival.<sup>183</sup> This very reason has allowed the Tamil diaspora communities to influence domestic politics and to project its voice through these local political parties and politicians.

#### Analysis of activities in the UK

Analysis of the BTF and the GTF approaches in the UK indicates that they use their political significance very tactfully to canvas domestic support to the Eelam cause. The Tamil diaspora political organizations to name TLP, BTC, and BTLD pool the Tamil diaspora votes and support either labor, conservative, or liberal democrats who voice the Tamil grievances the best. Further, they try to create a Tamil diaspora opinion that a referendum would be the ideal solution to the problem. Activities such as holding

---

<sup>182</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*, 2.

<sup>183</sup>Sunday Observer, “Tiger Terror Campaign: Most Brutal Killings in November,” <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/12/01/fea04.asp> (accessed 2 December 2013).

elections and referendums are reported to be steps towards strengthening the position that the Tamil diaspora into a democratic process after the defeat of the LTTE.

On the other hand, they use their reach to key decision makers and celebrities in the UK to change their attitude to support such “non-violent” and “political-diplomatic” process and to pressure the GoSL to solve the Tamil problem in their favor. The main messages in the UK can be identified as “will of the Tamil people is an Eelam state” and “referendum” is the solution.

However, the problem for the Tamil diaspora in the UK is that their influence, both political and diplomatic, is still not enough to convince and invite the UK’s national pressure for a definitive referendum to create a separate state in Sri Lanka. Actions by the UK such as issuing statements on war crimes and investigations against Sri Lanka are a part of their foreign policy anyway towards Sri Lanka whilst still trying to satisfy the Tamil diaspora living in the UK. As per the model discussed in chapter 3, the Tamil diaspora has gained some successes in steps 1 and 2, but it has not been able to reach the trigger in invite necessary international pressure.

#### Analysis of activities in Canada

Analysis of the Tamil diaspora approach in Canada indicates that it also uses a similar line as in the UK. However, Canadian Tamil diaspora influence is comparatively higher than in the UK. Having a Tamil origin MP in the Canadian parliament is an added advantage for the Tamil diaspora’s voice. However, whether the Canadian government would heed a single voice is still doubtful. It seems that the Canadian Tamil diaspora is making efforts to use the position of MP Ms. Rathika Sitasabaieasan (NDP) on Sri Lanka and the Tamil ethnic issue to influence the Canadian government policy line.

Holding elections and referendums in Canada are still steps towards consolidating its position and commitment into a democratic process and a struggle detached from a “violent” approach. The Canadian Tamil diaspora’s main focus is also to press for a referendum on Sri Lankan Tamil sovereignty. Key messages that it communicates to decision makers in Canada are the “will of the Tamil people is for an Eelam state” and “referendum” is the solution. Further, it also consolidates as opinion that the GoSL committed war crimes against the Tamil population and therefore that government has no credibility providing a solution to the Tamil ethnic problem.

The concentrated deployment of the Tamil diaspora in Canada makes its members comparatively important especially during the elections. Whilst the Canadian domestic politicians use the Tamil votes for their advantage, the Tamil diaspora is getting benefits from the Canadian position on the human rights situation, war crimes, investigations, and democracy issues in Sri Lanka. In that sense, the Canadian Prime Minister Mr. Stephen Harper boycotting the CHOGM in 2013 being seen as a strategic move to satisfy the Tamil diaspora is thereby understandable. However, still, as per the model, a significant pressure towards the trigger for a referendum or initiations towards the same is not yet evident at a national level.

#### Analysis of activities in the U.S.A.

An analysis of the TGTE approach in the U.S. indicates that it also uses a similar line as in the UK and Canada. However, in the U.S., the TGTE’s approach is more towards legitimizing the Eelam cause and consolidating the credibility of the TGTE in order to gain some recognition. The TGTE’s commitment to hold regular elections to elect members to its political structure, holding parliamentary sessions, and creating

constitutions are significant as those actions demonstrate its desire to take part in democratic political processes.

The key messages of the TGTE to decision makers in the U.S. are the “Eelam cause is legal,” the “will of the Tamil people is for an Eelam state,” and “referendum” is the solution. The TGTE’s efforts to add a senate to its political structure and appoint legal experts to the same are also endeavors to strengthen its position as a “legal entity.”

However, unlike in the UK and Canada, the Tamil diaspora in the U.S. has not been successful in influencing the U.S. electorate. Even though the U.S. policy towards the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, war crimes, investigations, and democracy issues in Sri Lanka are akin to the Tamil diaspora message, the U.S. policy towards a separate state is contradicting the Tamil diaspora endstate. As such, even though the TGTE gets a recognition, how it would convince the U.S. to create a separate state in Sri Lanka is doubtful.

#### Analysis of Tamil Diaspora Informational Approach

The Tamil diaspora informational approach has a similarity with the model suggested in the chapter 3. To support the “political-diplomatic” approach in the countries of residence, the LTTE / pro-LTTE media networks calculatedly and collaboratively use its printed and electronic media. They extensively use social networks not only as a mean of message, propaganda, and information dissemination but also to organize e-campaigns such as e-signatory campaigns and e-petitions.

The Tamil diaspora informational approach is focusing on heads of states, eminent and influential personalities, opinion and decision makers, influential international institutions, and international organizations in line with the “political-

diplomatic” approaches. These networks twist the outcomes of “political-diplomatic” approaches to their advantage. The main focuses are creating a negative international opinion on the GoSL, discrediting the GoSL actions and undermining the GoSL approach to address grievances of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.

However, even for the Tamil diaspora informational approach, what is missing is a trigger event after 2009. As such, the LTTE / pro-LTTE media networks widely use the “genocide” allegation attached to the final stages of war in 2009 as sympathy attached to this message can play a role in the eyes of the international community. The Tamil diaspora would like to refer to the GoSL victory as a “genocide” of Tamil people so that others could consider it as the trigger event. However, to this date, significant pressure on the GoSL for a referendum for a separate state based on this “genocide” message is not evident. Since the “Tamil genocide” in Sri Lanka has not been proved thus far and a lack of evidence to prove the same continues to this point, the claim of a “genocide” by the GoSL against its Tamil population is difficult to argue.

#### Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora Approaches as per the Suggested Model

Previous analysis highlighted that post-war Tamil diaspora groups are still focusing on Tamil nationalism and trying to distinguish as a separate ethnie from the Sinhala majority in Sri Lanka. Their main aim is to classify Tamil nationality as a separate ethnic entity in Sri Lanka and seek autonomy. They use ethnic commonality to mobilize the support of other Tamil diaspora segments living around the world towards this end. Even though no military hierarchical structure is evident in the present “non-violent” Tamil diaspora network, they have a political hierarchical structure. They have a prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, a speaker and a deputy speaker, ministers

and deputy ministers for different portfolios. Figure 6 depicts the political structure of the TGTE.




Figure 6. Political Structure of the TGTE

Source: Ministry of Defense, *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012* (Colombo: Government Printers, 2012), 15.

In contrast to the LTTE's political structure, the TGTE's political structure is significant as its leaders are selected through a worldwide Tamil diaspora election. In the case of the LTTE, both military and political leaders were appointed and removed by the LTTE leader and there was no democratic process followed. Selecting its political representation through an election process is a way that the TGTE could demonstrate its

desire and commitment for the democratic process. Comparison of the Tamil diaspora's pre and post 2009 activities clearly highlights that it is trying to disassociate itself from violent activities and focus on "non-violent" ones. Table 3 depicts the Tamil diaspora's pre and post 2009 activities:

Table 3. Comparison of Pre and Post 2009 Tamil Diaspora Activities

| Serial | Pre 2009 Activities   | Post 2009 Activities  |
|--------|---|---|
| 1.     | Fundraisings to support the LTTE  | Fundraisings to support Eelam Tamils  |
| 2.     | Procuring arms, ammunition, and other warlike materials to the LTTE   | Holding elections, referendum and engage in other political activities  |
| 3.     | Running the LTTE's shipping networks  | Political engagements in countries of residence   |
| 4.     | Running the LTTE's investments  | Establishing diplomatic relations with foreign governments  |
| 5.     | Extensive propaganda to justify the Eelam cause and the LTTE actions, mis-information campaign against the GoSL actions, and attempts to discredit the GoSL approach towards the LTTE | Extensive propaganda to justify the Eelam cause, international perception management, mis-information campaign against the GoSL actions, and discredit the GoSL approach towards the Tamil grievances |
| 6.     | Moral support to the LTTE and the separatist cause  | Moral support to the Eelam cause  |
| 7.     | Legitimize the LTTE's activities and the LTTE's "freedom struggle" for the Tamil people   | Legitimize the "non-violent" and "political-diplomatic" approach for freedom for the Tamil people   |

*Source:* Created by author.

Summary of the Tamil diaspora approach as per the model created in chapter 3 is discussed in following paragraphs:

1. Political approach: The political approach of the Tamil diaspora constitute number of sub lines. The main focus of the political approach is to consolidate the Eelam ideology through political processes such as holding worldwide referendums to create the

opinion that “Eelam is the will of the Tamil diaspora.” The Tamil diaspora uses its vote blocs in countries of residence as a tool to influence the domestic politics in favor of the Tamil cause and to establish international support towards the Tamil cause. Additionally, the Tamil diaspora involves itself in domestic politics through representation in the political mainstream so that their voice can be projected well. Whilst these efforts continue, the Tamil diaspora establishes links with like-minded Tamil political leaderships in Sri Lanka to ensure their thinking is also aligned with Eelam cause, so that any local negotiations by the Tamil political leadership will always meet the Tamil diaspora’s endstate.

2. Diplomatic approach: the main focus of the diplomatic approach is to gain a recognition for the democratic and political approach towards the Eelam pathway in particularly to operations of the government in exile, the TGTE. This is done by establishing contacts with political figureheads, diplomats, eminent personnel, celebrities, and key policy and decision makers. Those contacts will then be fed with the idea that the Tamil aspirations could only be met with creating a separate state so that the Eelam struggle is justified in the eyes of the international community. Subsequently, those diplomatic links are used to exert pressure on the GoSL to address the Tamil grievances as per the line advocated by the Tamil diaspora. This approach is further focuses on consolidating the idea that the TGTE is the governing body of the Tamil diaspora and also to gain a legitimacy for the “non-violent” and “diplomatic-political” approach of the Eelam struggle. Both the political and diplomatic approaches are working side by side as one complements the other.

3. Informational approach: The Tamil diaspora uses propaganda and an informational approach as a strategic tool and this should not be discussed in isolation. It is a supplement to political and diplomatic approaches. They use this tool comprehensively to manage and manipulate information to its own advantage, to discredit the GoSL, shape the strategic picture and convince international audiences including key decision makers to support their strategic objectives. This approach is two-folds. One branch is focusing on the Tamil diaspora themselves and the other branch is focusing on the international community.

The objectives of the first branch is to propagate the Eelam ideology in order to message and mobilize the diaspora for support towards the Eelam cause, unite the Tamil diaspora towards the Eelam cause, and keep the Eelam cause vibrant in the cyberspace. The other branch is focusing on mis-information and dis-information campaigns, the highlighting of alleged intimidation and suppression of the Tamil population by the GoSL, the alleged military oppression of the Tamils, the alleged militarization of the Tamil homeland by Sri Lankan Forces, and to discredit the conduct of the war against the LTTE, and highlight the war was against the Tamil people, and allege Tamil genocide. The objective of this message is to discredit the GoSL and paint a negative picture on GoSL's approach towards the Tamil population in the post-war period.

“Boycott Sri Lanka” is another parallel approach used to discourage Sri Lankan products abroad in order to inflict economic casualties. Additionally, the propaganda and informational approach is managing the perception of state and non-state actors through mis-information and dis-information campaigns. Their ultimate goal is to gain sympathy

towards the Tamil population, sway international opinion towards the Eelam cause, change international perception and solicit international support.

4. Trigger events: For the Tamil diaspora, the missing piece is a trigger event since 2009. There was not any recorded violence from the host nation (GoSL) for the Tamil diaspora to capitalize on. Thus, the Tamil diaspora continues to focus on alleged war crimes and the Tamil genocide by the GoSL during the final stage of the war in 2009. Even though the international community does not consider this as a trigger event to intervene, still, it has caught some attention as evident during the last few human rights council sessions. Alternatively, the Tamil diaspora is exploiting the local Tamil representation (TNA) to highlight intimidation, suppression, and political discrimination of the Tamil community by the GoSL so that the Tamil diaspora can replace “violence” with “discrimination.”

5. Pressure for a referendum: Even though the Tamil diaspora held a referendum to validate the Tamil diaspora’s will for a separate state, thus far no state or non-state actor has significantly pressured the GoSL towards such an end. One exception is the Tamil Nadu State Assembly passing a resolution in March 2003 asking the Indian Central Government to hold a referendum to create a separate state for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. However, the Indian Central Government rejected this call for a referendum.

#### Analysis of the Tamil Diaspora and the TNA Alignment

The TNA’s election manifesto continues to project the LTTE ideology and shows no major deviation between its 2001 (pre-war) and 2013 (post-war) platforms.<sup>184</sup> The

---

<sup>184</sup>The Nation, “Tamil National Alliance–LTTE Separatist Manifestos–2001, 2004, 2010 and now 2013,” <http://www.nation.lk/edition/special/item/21131-tamil->

TGTE, the GTF, and the TNA manifestos reflect the Vaddukoddai's resolution principles and the Tamil diaspora influence on local Tamil politics through the TNA is thus best met. It is a fact that the TNA's manifesto has always been to please the Tamil diaspora and not looking at the genuine grievances of Tamils in Sri Lanka.<sup>185</sup> TNA's radical stance on the Tamil nationalist position is welcomed and praised and any accommodation is attacked and criticized by the Tamil diaspora. The GTF has identified the TNA as "the elected representatives of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka."<sup>186</sup> Over and above the political and ideological alignment, the TNA's dependence on Tamil diaspora funds especially for its political campaign<sup>187</sup> has also given Tamil diaspora elements a great degree of control over the TNA. The TNA's behavior to satisfy the Tamil diaspora over this dependence is thus understandable.

The TNA's objectives emphasizing on power sharing arrangements of the Tamils and devolution of power satisfying the TGTE's objective of working in partnership with the Tamil leadership in the island of Sri Lanka that support and advocate for the realization of the Tamils' legitimate political aspirations to regain their sovereignty and

---

national-alliance-ltte-separatist-manifestos-%E2%80%93-2001-2004-2010-and-now-2013.html (accessed 15 February 2014).

<sup>185</sup>D. B. S. Jeyaraj, "Tamil National Alliance Election Manifesto Aimed at Tamil Diaspora and not Meant for Tamil Voters of North," <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/25463> (accessed 15 February 2014).

<sup>186</sup>ICG, *Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solution: Asia Report No. 239* (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2013), 14, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/239-sri-lanka-tamil-politics-and-the-quest-for-a-political-solution> (accessed 15 February 2014).

<sup>187</sup>Asiantribune, "Tiger Diaspora Funding the TNA Election Campaigns in Jaffna and Vavuniya," <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/21945> (accessed 15 February 2014).

the right to self-determination. TNA's role is also very important because as the local representation of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka it can attach a greater credibility to the Tamil diaspora message of Tamil intimidation, suppression, and political discrimination by the GoSL.

#### Analysis of the Impact on Sri Lanka

Alignment of the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora's ideologies have already been established in previous analyses. The LTTE's three decade long military approach to actualize its Eelam ideology failed in 2009. This demonstrated that the use of military approach in Sri Lanka did very little to achieve desired endstate in the present political, diplomatic, and security environments. Contrary to the LTTE's military approach, the Tamil diaspora's "political-diplomatic" and "informational" approaches have some momentum as today's trends are "non-violent" and "political-diplomatic" approaches for "freedom struggles." The primary question of this research was how will the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora contribute to separatism in Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE. The analysis of approaches highlighted synchronization of "political-diplomatic" and "informational" approaches to achieve the strategic endstate of establishing an "Eelam state."

Externally, the Tamil diaspora uses its political significance in host countries to influence domestic politics in its favor through active participation and representation in the political mainstream, to create the idea that "Eelam is the will of the Tamil people" through referendums, e-petitions, and establishing links, and influencing local Tamil political leadership along separatist lines. It uses its diplomatic reach to establish links with politicians, diplomats, eminent personalities, celebrities, policy makers, critical

decision makes, and other non-state actors that could influence Sri Lanka. It supports an opinion that Tamils have continuously been discriminated against and oppressed in Sri Lanka, justify and legitimize the Eelam struggle, legitimize the TGTE, and strive to convince the international community to put pressure on Sri Lanka towards enacting a greater level of devolution of power for the north and east of Sri Lanka that would facilitate establishing the state of Eelam or invite third-party intervention for a referendum.

The Tamil diaspora media network has four major objectives. It keeps the Eelam cause alive and vibrant in order to galvanize the Tamil diaspora support towards it. Then it reinforces political and diplomatic approaches to add value to the political significance and furthering diplomatic reach of the Tamil diaspora. Further, it overloads information in cyberspace, discredit the GoSL, consolidate “genocide,” “war crimes,” messages, and manage the perception of international community. Both political and diplomatic approaches are then synchronized to mount “political–diplomatic” pressure on the GoSL towards an agreeable solution, in failing a referendum. It seems that the Tamil diaspora informational approach always tries to identify the approaches of the countries in discussion on Sri Lanka and modify its message to catch the very wind.

Internally, the Tamil diaspora uses local Tamil political representation (TNA) in two ways. Firstly, to voice the “agreeable solution” to Sri Lankan Tamil grievances in line with the separatist thinking. Secondly, to consolidate and justify the Tamil diaspora message to the world. The TNA’s participation in the GoSL political mainstream is merely to highlight the GoSL’s inability to meet Tamil aspiration despite genuine Tamil political engagement with the GoSL. So that the TNA will advocate devolution of power

with full autonomy based on the Vaddukoddai Resolution principles, which in turn is the blueprint of a separate Eelam state.

#### The Tamil Diaspora Roadmap

When compared to the models adopted in East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan, each also had elements of political, diplomatic, and informational approaches. Even though the three cases had not taken a single trajectory, their general approach towards actualizing the endstate through a referendum is very much similar. For the Tamil diaspora, at this stage, achieving the endstate is still a distant objective. However, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora's approach towards the endstate is very similar to the generic models of East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan in its non-violent efforts. The Tamil diaspora's roadmap to establish the Eelam can finally be sketched as follows:




Figure 7. The Tamil Diaspora Roadmap

Source: Created by author.

### Analysis of the obstacles to the Tamil Diaspora Roadmap

When comparing the figure 7, major component that is missing for the Tamil diaspora is a trigger event required for the international pressure for a third-party intervention or a call for a referendum. Further, chapter 3 highlighted three major obstacles for a separatist movement in gaining the international support towards their endstate. Firstly, even though the countries like the UK and Canada favor the Tamil diaspora approach due to electoral pressures, they are careful not to apply definitive pressure for a separate state in Sri Lanka as it may be counterproductive for them as they too face separatist movements themselves. Secondly, even though human rights situations, war crimes, investigations, and democracy issues in Sri Lanka are in focus, the continued absence of unacceptable levels of violence specifically against the Tamil community in Sri Lanka after 2009 reduces any international momentum for a third-party intervention or a call for a referendum in Sri Lanka.

Thirdly, the Tamil diaspora has not been able to convince strong states, especially the permanent members of the UN Security Council, such as China and Russia, who could block or nullify any international pressure against the GoSL in the event of a pressure for a referendum. India as the closest neighbor to Sri Lanka will also have major concerns for a separate state for the Tamils in Sri Lanka as it could potentially have spillover effects in south India as well. In these areas, in the absence of a trigger, the Tamil diaspora's main efforts at this moment appear to be to highlight claims about the discrimination of the Tamil population by the GoSL and the inability and unwillingness of the GoSL to address the grievances of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora has not yet overcome the three obstacles.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

Acts of violence to achieve independence were largely rejected as illegitimate by the international community after 9/11. East Timor (2002), Kosovo (2008), and South Sudan (2011) are a few successful separatist stories of the recent past. All these cases proved the possibility of success for the “political-diplomatic” approach but each required other conditions and actions.

The LTTE manipulated the plight of Tamil minority aspirations, and robbed the moderate Tamil “political” and “peaceful” initiatives to redress Tamil grievances, eliminated Tamil leaders and rival groups, and resorted to “violent” and “armed struggle” to create a separate state for the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The LTTE could not achieve separatist Eelam statehood even after fighting for nearly three decades. The LTTE’s military defeat in 2009 highlighted the lower probability of a total military approach to the problem.

The military defeat of the LTTE saw the GoSL overcoming only the operational center of gravity (the military component), but its strategic center of gravity, the Tamil diaspora, the external contributor, still remains intact. In addition, the grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamil people inside and in the diaspora remain. Even though the armed organization in Sri Lanka was eliminated, the desire by some Tamil people for a Tamil state was not extinguished. Chapters 2 and 4 already established the importance of the Tamil diaspora as an external actor in the LTTE’s lifecycle during the LTTE war, the present expansion of the Tamil diaspora network, and the conceptual alignment of the

Tamil diaspora network with the LTTE’s separatist Eelam ideology. This answered the secondary question about the strategic importance of the Tamil diaspora in the post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s case is unique for a few reasons. Firstly, it may be one of very few instances that a separatist movement’s armed component was completely defeated militarily. Secondly, it may be one of a few instances where an external actor, a diaspora, continued the struggle when the internal armed actor (LTTE) ceased to exist.

Recognizing the military defeat of the LTTE and understanding the international environment better, the Tamil diaspora had realized the negative impacts of a “violent” approach and the international rejection of such an approach. Instead, the Tamil diaspora continues to promote the separatism ideology through “political-diplomatic” and “informational” approaches, and this has gained some momentum in some local and national political groups.

Previous chapters highlighted the political, diplomatic, and informational approaches of the Tamil diaspora and summarized how political, diplomatic and informational approaches are carefully used by the Tamil diaspora to move towards the desired endstate. This answered the secondary question about the approaches used by the pro-separatist Tamil diaspora to achieve separatism in Sri Lanka. Analysis of the alignment and relationship of the Tamil diaspora and the TNA highlighted the approach of the Tamil diaspora to register the Eelam ideology through the local Tamil political representation in Sri Lanka and how it uses the TNA to canvas the separatist cause and support the strategic message. Further, the generic model adopted in East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan was also used to compare and contrast the Tamil diaspora approach.

This answered the secondary question that thus far, these endeavors do not pose a significant threat to the sovereignty and unity of Sri Lanka.

The Tamil diaspora synchronizes its political, diplomatic, and informational approaches in time and space to voice a single message that “Eelam is the will of the Tamil people.” The Tamil diaspora’s political significance will influence the domestic politics in favor of the Tamil struggle and the Eelam cause, and its diplomatic reach to politicians, diplomats, eminent persons, policy makers and critical decision makers will be used to justify the cause, shape, and chart the path towards a separate state.

Subsequently, this concept will locally be registered into the Tamil population in Sri Lanka through like-minded Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka mainly through the TNA. The TNA will project themselves as the local representatives of the Tamil people in the north and east, take part in Sri Lankan political mainstream, and fight for the Tamil rights based on the Eelam ideology to gain full autonomy for Tamils.

The TNA will further support the Tamil diaspora message “why Eelam is necessary” by establishing the inability of the GoSL to accommodate Tamil grievances and unwillingness for meaningful power sharing with the Tamil community. The Tamil diaspora’s informational approach will be calculated to use the message to both the Tamil diaspora itself and the international community. This will answer the primary question about how will the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora contribute to separatism in Sri Lanka after the defeat of the LTTE.

However, at this moment achieving the endstate is further away. The Tamil diaspora needs trigger events and more international pressure for a third-party intervention or a call for a referendum to actualize the Eelam goal. The diaspora still

needs to overcome three major obstacles, especially convincing strong states who could block or nullify any international pressure against the GoSL. How successful the Tamil diaspora will be in this area will decide whether or when the Tamil diaspora could achieve its strategic endstate.

It is observed that the GoSL's victory did not place much stress on the external factors, specifically, the GoSL did not address the Tamil diaspora factor. The possible outcome of an insurgency can be a government loss, a government victory, a mixed outcome (either stalemate or negotiated settlement), and an inconclusive or ongoing outcome. The government can gain victory by destroying the insurgents' military structure, political structure, or both. It should also be noted that a government victory may not last in the event that the government is unable to address the root causes. Signs of decline of an insurgent organization in the trajectory of a government victory include greater decline of international assistance to include funding specially from diaspora communities.<sup>188</sup> However, a significant decline of international assistance (at least from a few countries) or diaspora support to the LTTE cause was not evident during or after the resolution stage of the conflict. As such, the GoSL addressing external factors (diaspora in particular) and internal factors (root causes in particular) are of paramount importance. Otherwise, the GoSL military victory may not achieve its overall goal of a unified and strong Sri Lanka.

---

<sup>188</sup>Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 14-12, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\\_MG965.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf) (accessed 16 March 2014).

### Fundamental Findings

Based on outcomes of chapter 4, fundamental findings of this research are as follows:

1. The Tamil diaspora continue to promote the separatist ideology in Sri Lanka even after the military defeat of the LTTE.
2. The Tamil diaspora calculatedly uses political, diplomatic, and informational approaches to canvas international support to promote a separatist ideology in Sri Lanka.
3. The Tamil diaspora uses like-minded Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka to actualize its separatist ideology.
4. The general model used in East Timor, Kosovo, and South Sudan is followed by the Tamil diaspora but thus far it has not been able to overcome the three major obstacles.

### Recommendations

Continuing attempts by the Tamil diaspora on the separatist cause and exploitation of the same through a like-minded Tamil political leadership in Sri Lanka should be addressed to ensure the dividends of peace in Sri Lanka. It is observed that the military defeat of an insurgency will only provide an opportunity to address the root causes in order to avoid any resurgence of a violent insurgency in the future. Whilst devising mechanisms to dislocate the Tamil diaspora's momentum towards an Eelam state, genuine Tamil grievances within Sri Lanka should be addressed to block and prevent the Tamil diaspora's capitalizing on such grievances within Sri Lanka. As such, the recommendations are at the national and international levels.

## National Level Recommendations

1. Addressing issues related to the Tamil community in war-ravaged areas through immediate, mid, and long-term projects is essential to raise the living standards and to reduce differences the Tamils perceive between their standards and other parts of the country. The hope of most of the Tamil people in north and east Sri Lanka is for a good life with dignity. Addressing their basic needs would certainly prevent the Tamil people accepting the claims and message of the Tamil diaspora seeking separatism.

2. Encourage the participation of and engage the local Tamil communities and their political representatives in mainstream politics through a well-established government mechanism that would address the political, economic, and social concerns of Tamils. This would allow the Tamil people to feel they are fairly represented and have a voice in mainstream politics; this ultimately would gain the support and confidence of the Tamil community.

3. Positive action needs to be taken to address deep rooted, genuine, and legitimate grievances of the Tamil community through devolution of power within the framework of the constitution of Sri Lanka. Genuine engagement by both the GoSL and the Tamil leadership (mainly TNA) to arrive at an acceptable power-sharing agreement is essential towards this end.

4. Establishing a monitoring mechanism consisting of security and law enforcement authorities to identify and prevent extremist elements of the Tamil diaspora accessing the local Tamil population with the ulterior motive of radicalizing them towards a pro-Eelam mindset.

## International Level Recommendations

1. Establishing a “think tank” to study the strategic consequences of the Tamil diaspora and its influence and formulate counter-strategies to meet those challenges.
2. Continuous engagement with state and non-state actors in countries where the Tamil diaspora influence is significant rather than disengage with them is also essential to dislocate the Tamil diaspora’s “political-diplomatic” approach and to present the other side of the story.
3. Pledge and show the international community the GoSL’s genuine commitment towards political solution to address deep rooted, genuine, and legitimate grievances of the Tamil community. One effort would be through a devolution of power within the framework of the constitution of Sri Lanka. Engagement with the international community to get an acceptance to a homegrown solution is also important.
4. The GoSL’s engagement with the Tamil diaspora groups is also important. Opportunities need to be given for the Tamil diaspora groups to genuinely support the Tamil community in the north and east. The Tamil diaspora should be encouraged to invest and engage in projects to uplift the conditions of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora should be made to understand that any attempt at a resurgence of violence is not helpful for the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.
5. Intelligence sharing and mutual legal cooperation with countries where the Tamil diaspora is significant is important. Sri Lanka should cooperate with counterpart agencies to share information on the Tamil diaspora criminal activities and for legal actions as domestic laws permit.

6. Establishing an effective and proactive propaganda mechanism to counter the Tamil diaspora’s “informational” approach that attempts to discredit the GoSL and mislead the local Tamil community and the international community. Enlighten the international community on the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka, its benefits to the Tamil community, the GoSL’s desire to address root causes of the Tamil issue, and articulate the same via this mechanism.

#### Avenues for Future Researches

This research focused on the political, diplomatic, and informational approaches by the Tamil diaspora to promote separatism in Sri Lanka in the context and focused on the Tamil diaspora activities in three countries only. There is an opportunity to study the Tamil diaspora activities in depth in a single country and focus on a single approach (either political, diplomatic, or informational). Further, devolution of power in Sri Lanka is another topic which has caught local and international attention. How the GoSL would share the power to address the Tamil issues is another area for which research can be useful. Whilst a large segment of the Tamil diaspora focuses on the political, diplomatic, and informational approaches, recent events in Sri Lanka suggested that extremist segments are still continuing to attempt to revamp the LTTE organization (locally and internationally) and are hoping to renew violence.<sup>189</sup> How the Tamil diaspora could contribute to the military approach is another research area with important conclusions.

---

<sup>189</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Attempted resurgence of the LTTE and the incident in the jungle off Padaviya on 11 April 2014,” [http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Attempted\\_resurgence\\_of\\_the\\_LTTE\\_and\\_the\\_incident\\_in\\_the\\_jungle\\_off\\_Padaviya\\_20140411\\_02](http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Attempted_resurgence_of_the_LTTE_and_the_incident_in_the_jungle_off_Padaviya_20140411_02) (accessed 14 April 2014).

## APPENDIX A

### AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF TAMIL DIASPORA GROUPS

#### Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE)

1. “Uniting all Tamil entities and elements who subscribe to the fundamental tenets of Tamil political aspirations proclaimed in the Vaddukoddai Resolution, which was subsequently endorsed and mandated in the general election of 1977 and in the Thimpu Principles in 1985”.
2. “Working in partnership with the Tamil leadership in the island of Sri Lanka, considering that the political policies and aspirations articulated by the Tamil leadership at consecutive elections in 2001 and 2004 were strongly endorsed and, thereby mandated, by the Tamil people, and other groups that support and advocate for the realization of the Tamils’ legitimate political aspirations to regain their sovereignty and the right to self-determination.”
3. “Articulating positions for negotiations with the Sinhala nation.”
4. “Establishing direct links with foreign governments and other international organizations.”
5. “Working for the social, economic and cultural well-being of the more than one million members of the Tamil diaspora.”
6. “Building a political program with the participation of Muslim representatives, taking into account that the diversity of Tamil and Muslim regions has been used as a threat in the past against the realization of the Tamils’ right to self-determination.”
7. “Performing such other tasks as may be necessary to promote the interests of the Tamil people in the North-East of the island of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Diaspora

liaising with international non-governmental organizations and international organizations to ensure that the Tamils' physical survival is guaranteed; to stop the sexual violence against Tamil women; to stop the physical abuse of Tamil children by the Sri Lankan government's mono-ethnic armed forces and ensure their speedy reunification with their families; to ensure the return of the thousands of Tamils held in internment camps to their homes and to bring to justice those who have committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity."

Global Tamil Forum (GTF)

1. "Alleviate the physical and emotional suffering of displaced and distressed Tamil people in the internment camps and to advocate for their freedom of movement and immediate rehabilitation in their homes."

2. "Bring to justice those who perpetrated genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Tamil Peoples."

3. "Campaign tirelessly, locally and internationally, to remove the occupying forces of Sri Lanka out from the traditional homeland of Tamils in the island of Sri Lanka."

4. "Prevent the colonization of the homeland of the Tamil people by the Sinhala majority community."

5. "Promote health, education, culture and economic development of Tamils in Eelam and the Tamil Diaspora."

6. "To use all resources available to the Tamil Diaspora to establish the Tamil people's right to self-determination and their right to re-establish their nationhood which

was taken away by force from them by the succeeding colonial powers including the Sri Lankan government.”

7. “Help empower Tamil people in Sri Lanka to take control of their destiny and clearly formulate and promote the benefits of freedom for all in the pursuit of sustainable growth and prosperity in the self-governing nation of Tamil Eelam.”

8. “Empower the Tamil society around the world through education, cultural and economic growth from the grassroots with youth and women involvement in all aspects of social activities.”

#### British Tamil Forum (BTF)

1. “Raise awareness amongst the British public, the decision makers and agencies working in the humanitarian and human rights fields of the on-going suffering of the Tamils in island of Sri Lanka.”

2. “Provide information to the British public and the decision makers about the political and economic oppression experienced by the Tamil community in Sri Lanka since independence from Britain and to help them understand the injustices and the discrimination against Tamils.”

3. “Work with all major British political parties, and the British government, to ensure that they recognize the legitimate socio-political aspirations of Tamils in the island of Sri Lanka and to help them find peace with justice and dignity.”

4. “Enable British Tamils to advance their social and cultural well-being.”

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Agencies*. Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993.

Gurr, Robert T., and Barbara Harff. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

Spencer, Metta., ed. *Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

### Government Publications

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006.

<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2013).

———. Training Circular No.7–100, *Hybrid Threats*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010.

Ministry of Defense, Sri Lanka. *Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis: July 2006–May 2009*. Colombo: Ministry of Defense, 2011.

———. *Re-emergence of LTTE International Network and Potential Threat–June 2012*. Colombo: Government Printers, 2012.

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom. *British Army Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10: Countering Insurgency*. London: Ministry of Defense, 2009. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16\\_11\\_09\\_army\\_manual.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_army_manual.pdf) (accessed 5 October 2013).

### Articles/Journals

Balasuriya, Mahinda. “LTTE’s Propaganda Infrastructure and LTTE’s exploitation of new Media Technology.” *The World Scientists*, 2013. <http://www.worldscientists.ru/defence-and-security/5-ltte-s-propaganda-infrastructure-and-ltte-s-exploitation-of-new-media-technology.html> (accessed 5 January 2014).

IHS Jane’s. *Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*. IHS Jane’s, 2013.

Lyons, Gene M., and Michael Mastanduno, ed. *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Reproduced U.S. Command and General Staff College. C 204

Reading A, “Some Framing Concepts for Strategic Understanding.” Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2013.

Robarge, Ed. Dr., and John Cary. “History and Culture: How the history of an ethnic group affects its values, beliefs, and attitudes.” Reproduced U.S. Command and General Staff College. Reading C151RC, “Culture and Military Operations.” Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Command and General Staff College, 2007.

#### Internet Sources/e Books

Aljazeera. “The History of the Tamil Tigers.” <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/11/2008112019115851343.html> (accessed 30 November 2013).

Anti-Defamation League (ADL). “Terrorism: International Terrorist Symbols Database: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” [http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/liberation\\_tigers\\_te1.asp](http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/liberation_tigers_te1.asp) (accessed 28 September 2013).

Asiantribune. “Tiger Diaspora Funding the TNA Election Campaigns in Jaffna and Vavuniya.” <http://www.asiantribune.com/node/21945> (accessed 15 February 2014).

BBC. “South Sudan Profile.” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082> (accessed 9 May 2014).

———. “Sri Lanka Profile: A Chronology of Key Events.” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12004081> (accessed 20 January 2014).

Boycott Sri Lanka. “About us.” <http://www.boycottsrilanka.com/about-us> (accessed 7 January 2014).

British Tamil Conservatives. “Letter to PM from APPGT.” <http://britishtamilconservatives.co.uk/2013/05/appgt-letter-to-prime-minister-david-cameron/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

British Tamil Forum. “Advocacy.” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/lobby/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. “Boycott Sri Lanka.” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/campaigns/appeals/boycott-sri-lanka/> (accessed 7 January 2014).

———. “British Tamils Forum: Working for Peace with Justice and Dignity.” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/about/> (accessed 18 November 2013).

———. “British Tamils Meet Labour Leader Ed Milliband to Discuss CHOGM and War Crimes in Sri Lanka.” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2013/11/british-tamils-meet-labour-leader-ed-milliband-to-discuss-chogm-and-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. “British Tamils press David Cameron on UK participation in CHOGM.” <http://tamilsforum.co.uk/2013/11/british-tamils-press-david-cameron-on-uk-participation-in-chogm/> (accessed 3 December 2013).

Brubaker, Rogers. “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora.” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 1. Tayler and Francis Limited, 2005, 1-19. [http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/29\\_Diaspora\\_diaspora\\_ERS.pdf](http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/brubaker/Publications/29_Diaspora_diaspora_ERS.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2013).

Byaman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\\_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf) (accessed 16 October 2013).

Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). “ARCHIVED: Commentary No. 77: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) International Organization and Operations-A Preliminary Analysis.” <https://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm77-eng.asp> (accessed 16 March 2014).

Canadian Tamil Congress. “CTC Press Conference and Channel 4’s ‘War Crimes Unpunished’ screened at the Canadian Parliament.” <http://canadiantamilcongress.net/article.php?lan=eng&id=54> (accessed 8 December 2013).

———. “Tamil Canadians Welcome Prime Minister Harper’s Principled Decision to Boycott CHOGM.” <http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/article.php?lan=eng&cat=pr&id=108> (accessed 12 December 2013).

Canadian Tamil Youth Alliance. “Canadian Tamil Youth declare uncompromising support for freedom at Tamil Eelam Sovereignty Conference.” <http://ctya.org/blog/canadian-tamil-youth-declare-uncompromising-support-for-freedom-at-tamil-eelam-sovereignty-conference/> (accessed 9 December 2013).

CBC News. “Canada’s first Tamil MP looks Forward to Challenge.” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/canada-s-first-tamil-mp-looks-forward-to-challenge-1.1061403> (accessed 8 December 2013).

———. “Tamil Migrants to be Investigated: Toews : Hundreds arriving in B.C. seek Refugee Protection.” <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/tamil-migrants-to-be-investigated-toews-1.898421> (accessed 7 December 2013).

Cheran, R. *Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka*. Berlin, Germany: Berghof Foundation for Conflict Management, 2004. <http://www.unitar.org/ny/sites/unitar.org.ny/files/DiasporaCirc.pdf> (accessed 8 December 2013).

Colombo Telegraph. “A Former US AG Joins Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam as a Senator, a Sinhalese also Joins the Senate.” <https://www.colombotelegraph.com>.

com/index.php/a-former-us-ag-joins-transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-as-a-senator-a-sinhalese-also-joins-the-senate (accessed 23 December 2013).

———. “Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter: A Giant Step in the Right Direction—Prof. Francis Boyle.” <https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/tamil-eelam-freedom-charter-a-giant-step-in-the-right-direction-prof-francis-boyle/> (accessed 22 December 2013).

Connable, Ben, and Martin C. Libicki. *How Insurgencies End*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND\\_MG965.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf) (accessed 16 March 2014).

Daily Mirror. “Prabha talks peace with TNA MPs.” <http://archives.dailymirror.lk/2004/04/21/front/1.asp> (accessed 30 November 2013).

Department of State. Department of State Publication 8484, *Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American) 26 December 1933*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969. [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/intam03.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp) (accessed 4 October 2013).

East Timor Government. “History of East Timor.” <http://www.easttimorgovernment.com/history.htm> (accessed 8 May 2014).

EIN Presswire. “Special Relationship with India will be maintained by Independent Tamil State in the Island of Sri Lanka: TGTE.” <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/154008901/special-relationship-with-india-will-be-maintained-by-independent-tamil-state-in-the-island-of-sri-lanka-tgte> (accessed 22 December 2013).

———. “TGTE Second Parliament Inaugurated, Elects Prime Minister and Speaker.” <http://www.einpresswire.com/article/180314436/transnational-government-of-tamil-eelam-s-tgte-2nd-parliament-inaugurated-elects-prime-minister-speaker> (accessed 20 December 2013).

Ember, R. Carol., Melvin Ember, and Ian Skoggard, ed. *Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World*. New York: Springer Science and Business Media Inc, 2005. <http://books.google.com/books?id=7QEjPVyd9YMC&printsec=frontcover&dq#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 12 October 2013).

Encyclopedia of Britannica. “Diaspora.” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora> (accessed 12 October 2013).

———. “Sovereignty.” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/557065/sovereignty> (accessed 4 October 2013).

Encyclopedia of Nations. “Sri Lanka–History.” <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Sri-Lanka-HISTORY.html> (accessed 25 September 2013).

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). “Taming the Tamil Tigers: From Here in the U.S.” 2008. [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil\\_tigers011008](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008) (accessed 21 September 2013).

Federal Research Division (FRD). “Country Studies: Sri Lanka.” <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html#lk0014> (accessed 22 September 2013).

Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.” <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf> (accessed 5 October 2013).

Global Brief. “The LTTE is Targeting Canada.” <http://globalbrief.ca/tomquiggin/2009/10/27/the-ltte-is-targeting-canada/> (accessed 7 December 2013).

Global Tamil Forum. “Global Tamil Forum meets with US Assistant Secretary Blake.” <http://globaltamilforum.org/userfiles/file/Press%20Statement%20-%20Robert%20O%20Blake%20March%202011%20Meeting%20-%20English%20Version%281%29.pdf> (accessed 23 December 2013).

———. “Vision and Mission.” <http://globaltamilforum.org/gtf/content/about-gtf> (accessed 18 November 2013).

Grant, Thomas, D. “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents.” <http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup13/Defining%20Statehood,%20The%20Montevideo%20Convention%20and%20its%20Discontents.pdf> (accessed 4 October 2013).

Hargreaves, Caroline, Martin Karlsson, Surabhi Agrawal, Jonathan Hootnick, and Katharine Tengtio. *International Dimensions of the Sri Lankan Conflict*. Scotland: University of St Andrews, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. [http://www.academia.edu/1565798/International\\_Dimensions\\_of\\_the\\_Sri\\_Lankan\\_Conflict](http://www.academia.edu/1565798/International_Dimensions_of_the_Sri_Lankan_Conflict) (accessed 14 October 2013).

Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL). *Guide to Analysis of Insurgency–2012*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012. <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599> (accessed 11 October 2013).

Human Rights Watch (HRW). *Funding the ‘Final War:’ LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2006. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/03/14/funding-final-war-0> (accessed 18 October 2013).

Ilankai Tamil Sangam. “Vaddukoddai Resolution.” [http://www.sangam.org/FB\\_HIST\\_DOCS/vaddukod.htm](http://www.sangam.org/FB_HIST_DOCS/vaddukod.htm) (accessed 11 October 2013).

Independent European Daily Express. “Genocide Replaces Separatism in Tamil Diaspora Vocabulary.” [http://www.iede.co.uk/news/2013\\_3309/genocide-replaces-separatism-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary](http://www.iede.co.uk/news/2013_3309/genocide-replaces-separatism-tamil-diaspora-vocabulary) (accessed 5 January 2014).

International Crisis Group (ICG). *The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE: Asia Report No. 186*. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2010. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186-the-sri-lankan-tamil-diaspora-after-the-ltte.aspx> (accessed 29 September 2013).

———. *Sri Lanka: Tamil Politics and the Quest for a Political Solution: Asia Report No. 239*. Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2013. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/239-sri-lanka-tamil-politics-and-the-quest-for-a-political-solution> (accessed 15 February 2014).

Jeyaraj, D. B. S. “Tamil National Alliance Election Manifesto Aimed at Tamil Diaspora and not Meant for Tamil Voters of North.” <http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/25463> (accessed 15 February 2014).

Ministry of Defense. “Attempted resurgence of the LTTE and the incident in the jungle off Padaviya on 11 April 2014.” [http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Attempted\\_resurgence\\_of\\_the\\_LTTE\\_and\\_the\\_incident\\_in\\_the\\_jungle\\_off\\_Padaviya\\_20140411\\_02](http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Attempted_resurgence_of_the_LTTE_and_the_incident_in_the_jungle_off_Padaviya_20140411_02) (accessed 14 April 2014).

———. “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network.” [http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE\\_international\\_network.html](http://www.defence.lk/warcrimes/LTTE_international_network.html) (accessed 21 September 2013).

———. “Terrorist Cry Human Rights: Evidence: Many facets of Puthirasigamani Sugunya.” [http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20120309\\_03](http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20120309_03) (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. “The LTTE in Brief.” <http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2013).

News East West. “Tamil Canadians Honor Toronto Police Chief Bill Blair, donate \$47,000 to CAMH.” <http://newseastwest.com/tamil-canadians-honour-toronto-police-chief-bill-blair-with-leaders-for-change-award/> (accessed 8 December 2013).

Nostrand, Richard L., and Lawrence E. Estaville Jr. ed. “Introduction: The Homeland Concept,” *Journal of Cultural Geography* 13, no. 2 (1993). <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08873639309478384#preview> (accessed 4 October 2013)

Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. *Diasporas and Conflict Resolution: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?* Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006. <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0>

CCsQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F16804%2Fipublicationdocument\_singledocument%2F2d1dba5fbe99-4719-8a52-610398f892fa%2Fen%2Fdiaspora\_conflict\_resolution.pdf&ei=hbpfUvG0JOPi2QWB0oDIBA&usg=AFQjCNFmRMx7Ov4Ib-MDTvbH\_Y3vrDOGmw (accessed 4 October 2013).

PR Web. “Tamil for Obama Launches a Signature Campaign for a Referendum in Sri Lanka to Gain Self-Determination for Tamils.” <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/6/prweb8503874.htm> (accessed 20 December 2013).

———. “Tamil for Obama Meets with Assistant Secretary Blake, Asks Blake, Clinton to Push Self-Government Referendum in Northeastern Sri Lanka.” <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9326814.htm> (accessed 23 December 2013).

Samarakoon, Athulasiri, Kumara. “Ethnic Wars on Cyberspace: Case of Tamil Tigers and the Majoritarian Sinhalese State in Sri Lanka.” The 3rd International Conference on Humanities and Social Sciences. Thailand, Prince of Songkla University, 2011. <http://fv.libarts.psu.ac.th/conference5/proceedings/Proceedings3/article/5pdf/004.pdf> (accessed 19 October 2013).

Sunday Observer. “Tiger Terror Campaign: Most Brutal Killings in November.” <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/12/01/fea04.asp> (accessed 2 December 2013).

———. “TNA Manifesto contains Prabhakaran’s Policies.” <http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/09/08/pol03.asp> (accessed 30 November 2013).

Tamils Against Genocide. “About TAG.” <http://www.tamilsagainstgenocide.org/AboutTAG.aspx> (accessed 7 January 2014).

Tamil Canadian. “Organizations and Associations.” <http://www.tamilcanadian.com/page.php?cat=551&id=4295> (accessed 7 December 2013).

———. “TGTE Senate to Work on Roadmap to Tamil Eelam.” <http://www.tamilcanadian.com/article/6270> (accessed 20 December 2013).

Tamil Guardian. “Any political solution must ensure Tamil right to self-determination and irreversible autonomy—GTF.” <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=4273> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields screened to Canadian MPs.” <http://tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3568> (accessed 8 December 2013).

———. “Why a sports boycott is essential for justice.” <http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3270> (accessed 7 January 2014).

Tamils for Obama. "Contribution." <http://www.tamilsforobama.com/Contribution.html> (accessed 23 December 2013).

———. "Eelam Referendum." <http://www.tamilsforobama.com/Referendum2011/english.asp> (accessed 20 December 2013).

———. "Re: Your victory, and our part in it." [http://www.tamilsforobama.com/letters/congratulations\\_mr\\_President\\_2012.html](http://www.tamilsforobama.com/letters/congratulations_mr_President_2012.html) (accessed 23 December 2013).

———. "US Congress Urged to Support Independence Referendum in Northeast of Sri Lanka." <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/8/prweb10982515.htm> (accessed 22 December 2013).

Tamil National Alliance. "Our stand on the Political Solution." [http://tnapolitics.org/?page\\_id=11&lang=en](http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=11&lang=en) (accessed 30 November 2013).

TamilNet. "British MPs support international investigations of Sri Lanka mass killings." <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=34152> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. "Tamil youth in UK demand Referendum for Tamil Eelam." <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=36433> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. "5,000 Tamils marching in London reject LLRC, demand Tamil Eelam." <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=36199> (accessed 3 December 2013).

———. "99.8 percent say yes to Tamil Eelam in Canada Referendum." <http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=30845> (accessed 9 December 2013).

Tamil Youth Organization UK. "Boycott Sri Lankan Cricket." <http://www.tyouk.org/boycott/cricket.html> (accessed 7 January 2014).

The Guardian. "British-based Tamils vote for Independent State in Sri Lanka." <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/01/british-tamil-state-sri-lanka> (accessed 3 December 2013).

The Nation. "Tamil National Alliance–LTTE Separatist Manifestos–2001, 2004, 2010 and now 2013." <http://www.nation.lk/edition/special/item/21131-tamil-national-alliance-ltte-separatist-manifestos-%E2%80%93-2001-2004-2010-and-now-2013.html> (accessed 15 February 2014).

The Telegraph. "WikiLeaks: David Miliband championed aid to Sri Lanka to win votes of Tamils in UK." <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8175415/WikiLeaks-David-Miliband-championed-aid-to-Sri-Lanka-to-win-votes-of-Tamils-in-UK.html> (accessed 3 December 2013).

The Star. "Harper panders to Tamils by boycotting Commonwealth Summit." [http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/11/13/harper\\_panders\\_to\\_tamils\\_by\\_boycotting\\_commonwealth\\_summit.html](http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/11/13/harper_panders_to_tamils_by_boycotting_commonwealth_summit.html) (accessed 12 December 2013).

Transcurrents. "TNGTE: The Inaugural sessions of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam." [http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/tngte\\_the\\_inaugural\\_sessions\\_o.html](http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/tngte_the_inaugural_sessions_o.html) (accessed 20 December 2013).

Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE). "About us." <http://www.tgte-us.org/about.html> (accessed 20 December 2013).

———. "Mission Statement." <http://www.tgte-us.org/mission.html> (accessed 18 November 2013).

Wikipedia. "Anton Balasingham." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton\\_Balasingham](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anton_Balasingham) (accessed 15 March 2014).

———. "Division of the LTTE Political Wing." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisions\\_of\\_the\\_Liberation\\_Tigers\\_of\\_Tamil\\_Eelam#Political\\_wing](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisions_of_the_Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam#Political_wing) (accessed 28 January 2014).

———. "Kosovo War." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo#Kosovo\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo#Kosovo_War) (accessed 9 May 2014).

———. "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation\\_Tigers\\_of\\_Tamil\\_Eelam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberation_Tigers_of_Tamil_Eelam) (accessed 21 September 2013).

———. "Second Sudanese Civil War." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second\\_Sudanese\\_Civil\\_War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sudanese_Civil_War) (accessed 10 May 2014).

———. "Selvarasa Pathmanathan." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selvarasa\\_Pathmanathan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selvarasa_Pathmanathan) (accessed 14 March 2014).

———. "South Sudan." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Sudan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan) (accessed 10 May 2014).

———. "Tamil Canadian." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil\\_Canadian](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_Canadian) (accessed 7 December 2013).

———. "World Tamil Movement." [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_Tamil\\_Movement](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Tamil_Movement) (accessed 14 March 2014).

Wilson, Jeyaratnam A. "The Breakup of Sri Lanka: The Sinhala Tamil Conflict." <http://tamilnation.co/books/Eelam/wilson.htm> (accessed 25 September 2013).

———. *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century*. London: C. Hurst and Company, 2000.

<http://books.google.com/books?id=W3aAB9IFVdkC&pg=PA114#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 11 October 2013).

Yaylaci, Yusuf. "Denotation of the concept of Homeland in Western British and American Cultural and Linguistic Contexts." *Anadolu University Journal of Social Science*. Turkey: Anadolu University, 2008, 199-205.  
[http://www.academia.edu/541250/DENOTATIONS\\_OF\\_THE\\_CONCEPT\\_OF\\_HOMELAND\\_IN\\_WESTERN\\_BRITISH\\_AND\\_AMERICAN\\_CULTURAL\\_AND\\_LINGUISTIC\\_CONTEXTS](http://www.academia.edu/541250/DENOTATIONS_OF_THE_CONCEPT_OF_HOMELAND_IN_WESTERN_BRITISH_AND_AMERICAN_CULTURAL_AND_LINGUISTIC_CONTEXTS) (accessed 4 October 2013).